Minhag Ha-Sochrim: Jewish Law’s Incorporation of Mercantile Custom and Marketplace Norms

Rabbi Itamar Rosensweig^[1]

Minhag Ha-Sochrim: Jewish Law’s Incorporation of Mercantile Custom and Marketplace Norms

Introduction

Many litigants and students of Jewish law find it puzzling that commercial norms (minhag ha-sochrim)–customs and practices of the marketplace–may determine the outcome of a din Torah. After all, if the purpose of a din Torah is to adjudicate a dispute according to Torah law, why give any weight to practices that originate outside of Judaism, especially when they differ from the internal provisions of choshen mishpat (Jewish monetary law)?

This article offers an answer to that question by explaining Jewish law’s incorporation of commercial norms and the mechanism through which it does so. The goal of this article is to provide an exposition of minhag ha-sochrim as a halakhic doctrine and to explain its normative power within Jewish law.

This article unfolds as follows. Section I introduces minhag ha-sochrim as a halakhic principle of incorporation that validates external commercial norms, distinct from dina de-malkhuta dina. Section II demonstrates that minhag ha-sochrim is firmly anchored in the Talmud and its case law, establishing that it constitutes a well-founded principle of Jewish law. Section III surveys post-talmudic case law where poskim apply minhag ha-sochrim to regulate commercial relationships–such as rent control, bankruptcy, and equitable distribution of marital property–between Jewish parties. Section IV considers what counts as a “valid” commercial practice as well as several restrictions that may limit the application of minhag ha-sochrim. Section V examines minhag ha-sochrim’s conceptual basis: What is the mechanism through which halakhah incorporates these external norms? The section develops two theories. One is grounded in the power of individuals to attach conditions to their private agreements (tenai shel mamon). The other is rooted in the authority of the townspeople to enact legislation (takanot ha-kahal) to regulate commerce (rasha’in benei ha-‘ir le-hasi’a al kitzatan). Section VI discusses whether minhag ha-sochrim is limited to contractual relationships that arise by agreement or whether it extends to non-contractual disputes, such as tort actions and claims of unjust enrichment. Section VII concludes with reflections on minhag ha-sochrim as an internal principle of Jewish law and how it facilitates the interface of halakhah and modern commerce.

I. Principles of Incorporation: Dina De-Malkhuta Dina and Minhag Ha-Sochrim

Jewish law provides a comprehensive system of internal rules and principles that govern virtually all types of market interactions. But in addition to its internal provisions, Jewish law also contains principles of incorporation which incorporate and validate certain external commercial laws and practices that originate outside of Judaism. A principle of incorporation has the effect of making the external norm valid and binding as a matter of Jewish law.

Dina de-malkhuta dina is perhaps the best-known halakhic principle of incorporation. Through dina de-malkhuta, Jewish law incorporates some of the laws of the jurisdiction as halakhically binding. For example, under dina de-malkhuta, a tax imposed by congress becomes halakhically obligatory.^[2] Similarly, if congress lawfully expropriates someone’s property and converts it into public land, the transfer of ownership is recognized by Jewish law through dina de-malkhuta dina.^[3]

Minhag ha-sochrim is also a principle of incorporation, but it differs from dina de-malkhuta. Whereas dina de-malkhuta incorporates laws enacted by governments and sovereigns, minhag ha-sochrim incorporates customs and practices of the marketplace. Through minhag ha-sochrim, external marketplace norms become valid and binding as a matter of Jewish law.

To appreciate the difference between minhag ha-sochrim and dina de-malkhuta, notice that a commercial practice can be widespread without being enshrined into law. Contrariwise, a law may be formally proclaimed by a legislature but fail to gain support in real-world commercial practice. Minhag ha-sochrim grants halakhic recognition to commercial practices even when they are not formally enshrined in law. Dina de-malkhuta recognizes laws even when they have not achieved widespread practice.

Practically, minhag ha-sochrim may have a wider scope of application than dina de-malkhuta dina. This is because many poskim limit dina de-malkhuta. For example, some authorities maintain that dina de-malkhuta does not govern a private law dispute between two Jewish parties.^[4] Others hold that dina de-malkhuta is limited to cases where the law directly benefits the government or society (tikkun ha-medinah).^[5] Still others write that dina de-malkhuta does not apply wherever the secular law conflicts with an internal halakhic provision.^[6] And some hold that dina de-malkhuta does not apply in Israel.^[7] Yet poskim apply no such limitations to minhag ha-sochrim. Thus, minhag ha-sochrim enjoys a wider scope of application, and for that reason, it can serve as a more fruitful principle of incorporation than dina de-malkhuta dina.^[8]

II. Minhag Ha-Sochrim: The Talmudic Case law

Having introduced the concept of minhag ha-sochrim above, this section proceeds to establish its talmudic basis. This section and the next seek to demonstrate that minhag ha-sochrim is a well-founded principle of Jewish law. I wish to emphasize at the outset that minhag ha-sochrim is itself a provision of choshen mishpat (Jewish monetary law). When a beit din applies minhag ha-sochrim to decide a case, it may appear as if the dayanim are failing to apply Jewish law, that they are choosing secular commercial norms over the provisions of choshen mishpat. But this perception is inaccurate, since Jewish law itself provides, under the right conditions, for the incorporation of marketplace norms and for those norms to be halakhically binding. Thus, a pesak din that decides a case based on minhag ha-sochrim is no different from a pesak din that decides a case based on chazakah, migo, or shevu’a. They differ only in the halakhic principle or siman that controls the pesak: In one case, it is the halakhic principle of chazakah (or migo, shevu’a, etc.) that controls. In the other case, it is the halakhic principle of minhag ha-sochrim. The examples discussed in this section demonstrate that minhag ha-sochrim is a fundamental halakhic principle within dinei mamonot, firmly entrenched in the talmudic case law.

1. Ha-Kol Ke-Minhag Ha-Medinah

The Mishnah in Bava Metzia (83a), discussing employment agreements, establishes that ambiguous terms in a contract should be determined by regional custom (ha-kol ke-minhag ha-medinah). When an employment contract fails to specify some aspect of the agreement, such as the expected work hours or whether the employer will provide meals, the Mishnah rules that the ambiguous provisions should be filled out according to local custom: ha-kol ke-minhag ha-medinah.^[9]

Crucially, the Talmud defers to minhag ha-medinah even when it diverges from the halakhah’s normal set of rules. For instance, according to Jewish law, the workday begins at sunrise and concludes at nightfall: If you hired a worker and specified that the work hours are defined by din Torah (lit. “Torah law”), the workday would commence at sunrise and conclude at nightfall.^[10] Similarly, if you were to hire a worker in a city with no prevailing custom, and you didn’t specify the work hours, the agreement is filled in by din Torah, and the worker is obligated to work from sunrise to nightfall.^[11]

Yet the presence of workplace norms overrides the default din Torah. According to the Mishnah, if you hire a worker in a town with established workplace norms (e.g., a nine to five workday), the unspecified content of the employment agreement is filled out by workplace norms, not by the workday defined by din Torah.^[12] In other words, the commercial minhag overrides the internal provisions of choshen mishpat.^[13]

2. Minhag Mevatel Halakhah: Custom Prevails Over Halakhah

The Talmud Yerushalmi’s (Bava Metzia 7:1) commentary on the above case illuminates the power of custom in two significant ways. Commenting on the fact that local custom fills in the terms of the agreement rather than din Torah, the Yerushalmi concludes: “minhag mevatel halakhah”–literally, “custom overrides halakhah”.^[14] Here the Yerushalmi explicitly formulates the position that minhag overrides (mevatel) the internal rules of Jewish monetary law that would otherwise govern.^[15]

Some commentators go further and explain that the Yerushalmi’s conclusion “custom overrides halakhah” extends to the procedural rules for adjudicating disputes. Specifically, while Jewish law normally assigns the burden of proof to the claimant, minhag will shift that burden onto the party whose claim runs contrary to local custom. For example, suppose an employer and worker were in a dispute over the amount of compensation or benefits that was initially agreed upon. Under the internal procedural rules of choshen mishpat, the worker, as claimant, bears the burden of proof, since he is attempting to procure benefits or compensation from the employer. However, if the worker’s position is consistent with the customary compensation or benefits for workers in the area, then the worker prevails.^[16] Under this interpretation, minhag modifies the procedural rules for adjudicating disputes, shifting the burden of proof from the claimant (motzi) to the party whose position runs contrary to local minhag.

Having surveyed two of the Talmud’s explicit statements about the power of minhag to override the internal rules of Jewish monetary law (ha-kol ke-minhag ha-medinah and minhag mevatel halakhah), let us turn to talmudic rulings that reflect and presuppose the validity minhag ha-sochrim.

3. Situmta: Mercantile Custom as a Means of Conveyance

In Jewish law, the conveyance of property requires a kinyan. The Talmud details strict rules for how kinyanim are to be executed, and it specifies which kinyanim are valid for different types of property (e.g. real property can be conveyed through a symbolic payment (kesef) or by transferring a deed (shetar); small personal property is conveyed by lifting (hagbahah); domesticated animals can be conveyed by transferring the reins (mesirah)).^[17] Yet, notwithstanding the detailed rules and provisions for kinyanim indigenous to halakhah, the Talmud introduces the principle of situmta, which recognizes the prevailing commercial methods of conveyance as a valid halakhic kinyan.

Situmta is introduced in Bava Metzia 74a, where the Talmud refers to a commercial practice of marking wine barrels (situmta) to signify the conveyance of title to the purchaser. Marking barrels is not a kinyan specified by Jewish law. But the Talmud rules that it constitutes a halakhically valid kinyan wherever commercial norms treat it as such.^[18] Many authorities explain that situmta instantiates the general principle that Jewish law incorporates and recognizes prevailing commercial practices as halakhically valid.^[19]

A dispute recorded in the responsa of Ra’avan captures the novelty of situmta. The plaintiff claimed that he had purchased merchandise from the defendant and formalized the conveyance “in accordance with the customs of merchants,” by locking the door to the room where the merchandise was stored. The defendant countered that the sale was not valid because the plaintiff did not perform a halakhically recognized kinyan (the plaintiff never took possession of the merchandise through meshikhah).^[20] Ra’avan holds for the plaintiff, based on the principle of situmta.^[21] A commercially recognized form of acquisition is valid, even if it is not one of the kinyanim indigenous to Jewish law.^[22]

4. Can Established Commercial Norms Invalidate a Kinyan?

Situmta establishes that commercial norms can validate transfers that would otherwise not be recognized by Jewish law. Does minhag ha-sochrim also cut the other way? Suppose the halakhic mode of conveyance (kinyan) is contrary to the prevailing commercial norms. Does minhag ha-sochrim invalidate a transfer that is otherwise halakhically valid? For example, it is settled Jewish law that one can acquire real property by means of a down payment (kesef). But suppose commercial norms require transfers of real property to be in writing.^[23] If you attempted to purchase property exclusively through a down payment (kesef), would the commercial norms halakhically invalidate the kesef transfer?

The Talmud (Kiddushin 26a) discusses exactly this case and rules that custom overrides the halakhically prescribed kinyan.^[24] Rashi (s.v. lo kanah) explains that parties doing business in a commercial environment rely on the commercial norms to effectuate the transfer, not on the kinyan native to halakhah.^[25] Thus, the transfer is only effective when it complies with accepted commercial practices. The Shulchan Arukh codifies the Talmud’s ruling, and it is applied even more broadly by later poskim.^[26]

III. Applications of Minhag Ha-Sochrim in the Poskim

Having surveyed the Talmud’s statements on the power of minhag to override the internal provisions of Jewish monetary law, the present section examines how poskim apply minhag ha-sochrim to contemporary commercial practices. The goal of this section is to provide examples that illuminate both the scope of minhag ha-sochrim as a halakhic principle as well as its powerful effect on Jewish commerce through incorporating sweeping market regulations such as bankruptcy and rent control as binding under Jewish law.

1. What’s Included in a Sale?

The fourth and fifth chapters of Bava Batra contain extensive discussions of what items are included in a sale. The fourth chapter delineates rulings on whether doors and appliances are included in the sale of a house,^[27] whether air rights are included in the sale of land,^[28] and whether clothing racks and benches are included in the sale of a bathhouse.^[29] Similarly, the fifth chapter includes detailed provisions whether a mast and sail are included when you buy a boat,^[30] whether the sale of a wagon includes the horses that pull it;^[31] whether the sale of a donkey includes its saddle and reins,^[32] and whether the sale of a tree includes the land that houses it.^[33]

Yet, despite these internal provisions of Jewish law, poskim hold that they are only applicable in the absence of marketplace norms. Wherever there are recognized norms, the content of a sale between two Jewish parties is determined by the marketplace norms, not by the provisions of the fourth and fifth chapters of Bava Batra.^[34] Put differently, these chapters establish default rules for cases where there is no prevailing commercial norm. But in a jurisdiction governed by clearcut commercial rules, halakhah yields to the norms of the marketplace over its own delineated set of internal rules. If you sold your home in Teaneck and are unsure whether the chandelier goes with the house, the answer will generally turn on New Jersey law, not the fourth chapter of Bava Batra.^[35]

2. Situmta: Contracting in Futures, Intangibles, and Speculation

In Section II:3, we saw that situmta expands the set of halakhically valid kinyanim to include commercially recognized means of conveyance. Many authorities develop situmta further. They argue that situmta can validate types of commercial transactions that would ordinarily be impossible under Jewish law. According to these authorities, minhag ha-sochrim doesn’t simply bear on how a conveyance is performed. It expands the types of economic relationships recognized by halakhah.

Compared to Western legal systems, halakhah significantly limits the types of binding agreements that can be entered into. For example, an individual cannot contract to sell an item that does not yet exist (davar shelo ba le-’olam) or that is not yet in his possession (davar she-eno be-reshuto).^[36] Thus, I cannot sell you the penthouse in the apartment building that is not yet built. Nor can I sell you next year’s etrogim crop. Similarly, I cannot sell you merchandise that I do not yet have in inventory, even if I’ve placed the order from my supplier. Jewish law also invalidates: contracting mere intangibles (davar she-ein bo mamash), such as licenses, copyrights, use-rights, and air rights; contracting by verbal promise to execute a kinyan at a later date (kinyan devarim); and contracts conditioned upon contingencies that undermine the parties’ intent to categorically execute the agreement (asmakhta).^[37] In other words, most of the routine contracts that power modern commerce would be invalidated and unenforceable under the internal provisions of Jewish contract law.

However, many authorities argue that situmta and minhag ha-sochrim will make these contracts valid and enforceable wherever they conform with standard commercial practice. Tosafot, for example, discuss the problem of asmakhta in prenuptial agreements (shiddukhin). It was common practice in Ashkenaz for the bride and groom to enter into a prenuptial agreement (tena’im) imposing a monetary fine upon the side that breaks the engagement. Tosafot observe that such a provision is an asmakhta because the parties lack the requisite intent (gemirat da’at) to obligate themselves in the fine. Neither party, at the engagement, believes they will break it off. But Tosafot argue that the penalty provision is nevertheless halakhically binding under the principle of situmta because agreements containing that provision have become standard practice.^[38]

Other rishonim invoke situmta to recognize the sale of future interests that have not yet vested in the seller (davar shelo ba le-’olam, davar she’eno be-reshuto). For example, on the basis of custom, Rosh validates tax farming contracts, even though they involve the transfer of future interests (i.e., the transfer of tax obligations not yet assessed or collected).^[39] Similarly, Maharam holds that a promise to hire someone as a mohel for an unborn child or to honor him as a sandek, which would ordinarily be invalid under the principle of davar shelo ba le-’olam, becomes halakhically binding if such a practice is customary.^[40]

Authorities also appeal to situmta to recognize transactions in intangibles (davar she-ein bo mamash). Maharshal discusses the case of a merchant who had purchased an exclusive license from the municipality to sell brandy. Maharshal acknowledges that the license is an intangible asset (davar she-ein bo mamash) which cannot be purchased. According to the internal provisions of choshen mishpat, then, the merchant could not exclude others from selling brandy in the municipality.^[41] However, Maharshal notes that wherever it is customary to recognize such a license, halakhah will validate and enforce it under the principle of situmta.^[42] On that basis, Maharshal rules that the merchant’s exclusive license is enforceable as a matter of Jewish law.

In summary, many halakhic authorities interpret situmta as a sweeping halakhic validation of commercial relationships that would otherwise be impossible under Jewish law. Transactions in futures and intangibles and speculative agreements become halakhically binding when they conform with commercial practice.

3. Rashba’s Ruling on Spousal Inheritance

Rashba’s ruling on spousal inheritance illustrates the power of minhag to displace the internal provisions of halakhah. Rashba was asked to decide the following case. A couple had married in Perpignan, and the wife brought certain assets into the marriage. The wife died shortly thereafter, and a dispute broke out between her father and husband over who would inherit her property. Under Jewish law, a husband inherits the property of his deceased wife.^[43] But the father argued that the established custom and practice amongst the Jews of Perpignan was to follow the non-Jewish law, which did not recognize the right of a husband to inherit his wife.^[44]

Rashba rules in favor of the father, contrary to the general rule of spousal inheritance in Jewish law. He cites the practice (minhag) amongst the Jews of Perpignan to revert the assets to the deceased-wife’s father and reasons that any couple who married there without specifying to the contrary implicitly adopts the local custom. Rashba explains that the couple, therefore, at their marriage, implicitly agreed that the wife’s assets would revert to her father upon her death.^[45]

In this remarkable ruling, Rashba allows minhag to displace halakhah’s internal rules of spousal inheritance.^[46] As we shall see in the next example, some poskim see Rashba’s ruling as a precedent for allowing minhag to determine how marital property should be divided upon divorce.

4. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property

Married couples accumulate property over the course of their marriage. How should that property be divided upon divorce? Under Jewish law, the wife generally receives a payment for the value of the ketubah, and she recovers certain forms of property that she brought into the marriage or that she acquired during the marriage.^[47] All other marital assets go to the husband. By contrast, most jurisdictions in the United States provide for equitable distribution. Under this rule, the couple’s property will be divided “fairly” (equitably) between the husband and wife. The two systems of law sharply diverge when, for example, the husband was the primary earner during the marriage. Equitable distribution will typically distribute a significant portion of the husband’s earnings to the wife, whereas Jewish marital law (even ha-‘ezer) would not.

How, then, should a contemporary beit din divide marital assets upon divorce? Based on the principle of minhag ha-sochrim, some authorities maintain that if the majority of divorced couples in a given community divide their assets upon divorce according to equitable distribution, then equitable distribution constitutes a binding minhag–even if it is at odds with how Jewish law would normally distribute marital property.^[48] According to this approach, wherever equitable distribution rises to the level of a minhag, a beit din should divide marital property according to the principles of equitable distribution and not according to the internal provisions of Jewish marital law (even ha-‘ezer).^[49]

5. Maharshakh and R. Akiva Eger on Adjudicating in Accordance with the Customs of Merchants

An additional dimension of minhag ha-sochrim emerges from a decision of Maharshakh (d. 1601) regarding a dispute in the sixteenth century between two Venetian Jewish merchants. The core of the dispute was whether litigation over a business deal between the two parties was to be adjudicated according to the internal provisions of choshen mishpat or according to the commercial practices of Venetian merchants.

The plaintiff wanted to compel the defendant to adjudication that would be governed by the practices and norms of Venetian merchants. The plaintiff argued that adjudicating in this manner was itself the minhag ha-sochrim of the Jewish merchants in Venice. The defendant countered that the adjudication should be governed by the internal provisions of din Torah.^[50]

The dispute was sent to Maharshakh who ruled (Teshuvot 2:229) in favor of the plaintiff. Maharshakh reasons, based on the principle of situmta, that the parties are bound by the customs of the place where they did business, and he argues that minhag ha-sochrim includes the entire set of substantive principles and rules of decision that will determine the outcome of the adjudication.^[51]

Maharshakh further observes that the business deal in question would have been incoherent if interpreted according to Jewish law. Had the parties intended to be bound by the internal provisions of choshen mishpat, their actions were irrational and irresponsible–their actions, under Jewish law, offered them no means to protect their investment–“as if they were putting their money on the antlers of a deer and sending it off.”^[52] Thus, Maharshakh concludes that it would be wrong to allow the defendant to compel adjudication according to din Torah when the parties entered the deal–and the deal only made sense–assuming they would be bound by the customs of Venetian merchants.^[53] Maharshakh’s ruling is cited approvingly by R. Akiva Eger in his glosses to Choshen Mishpat.^[54]

Maharshakh’s ruling is important because it extends the principle of minhag ha-sochrim to include the whole body of procedural and substantive rules that will govern adjudication.^[55] Indeed, R. Akiva Eger’s formulation of Maharshakh’s ruling suggests that a minhag ha-sochrim to adjudicate in front of a panel of (non-Jewish) merchants with commercial expertise who will resolve the dispute according to commercial norms, rather than adjudicating in front of a beit din applying Jewish law, is binding.^[56]

Whereas our previous examples focused on narrow applications, such as validating the transfer of property or the implied terms of an employment contract, Maharshakh’s responsum provides for the entire adjudication to be conducted according to mercantile custom.

Our final two examples will illustrate how minhag ha-sochrim can give halakhic force to major commercial regulations like rent control and bankruptcy.

6. R. Moshe Feinstein on Rent Control

Jewish law has few restrictions on a landlord’s power to evict a tenant at the end of a lease term or to increase the rent at the end of the term.^[57] By contrast, many cities impose strict regulations on landlords, limiting their ability to raise rent and evict tenants. From the perspective of Jewish law, are Jewish parties bound by halakhah’s internal landlord-tenant laws or by the city’s regulations?

R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe Choshen Mishpat I, 72) rules that the parties are bound by the city’s rent control regulations. R. Moshe declines to analyze the issue through the lens of dina de-malkhuta dina, noting that the scope of dina de-malkhuta–where and when it applies–is hotly contested.^[58] Instead, R. Moshe bases his decision on the halakhic power of minhag ha-sochrim, citing the precedents discussed above of the power of minhag to determine the terms of an employment agreement and the content of a sale.

R. Moshe explains that when a landlord and tenant enter into a lease agreement, they implicitly accept the background commercial rules and customs, even if the custom originated outside of the Jewish community. Unless the parties had agreed to be bound exclusively by Jewish law’s internal set of rules for landlord-tenant relationships, they have implicitly accepted the rules and practices of the jurisdiction and are bound by them.^[59]

7. Bankruptcy

Putting aside the special case of shemitah,^[60] the internal provisions of Jewish law do not allow for a debtor to declare bankruptcy to clear himself from financial liability. Under Jewish law, an insolvent debtor–even if he has no assets to his name–always remains liable to repay his debts.^[61] In contrast, most western economies provide bankruptcy protections for insolvent debtors, allowing them to declare bankruptcy and become free from their past debt. Does Jewish law incorporate these external bankruptcy provisions?

Some poskim write that even if dina de-malkhuta cannot recognize federal bankruptcy laws,^[62] minhag ha-sochrim can incorporate them wherever bankruptcy has become standard commercial practice.^[63] A responsum of Maharshakh offers us a precedent from the 16^th century for recognizing bankruptcy through minhag ha-sochrim. In Maharshakh’s case, an insolvent debtor owed money to several creditors. In the interest of securing at least partial payment, most of the creditors collectively agreed to compromise and to accept only partial payment for the money they were owed. But one creditor held out, insisting that the debtor repay him the entire amount he owed. In effect, most of the creditors agreed on a bankruptcy rule: the debtor would use his remaining assets to pay back a portion of the amount he owed to each creditor and he would be released from the remaining liability–but the arrangement was being held up by one creditor who insisted on receiving full payment.

Maharshakh ruled that the majority of creditors can compel the individual hold-out-creditor to abide by the bankruptcy agreement reached by the majority. Maharshakh reasons that because it is customary for creditors to reach such bankruptcy settlements with insolvent debtors, the recalcitrant creditor is bound by the minhag ha-sochrim.^[64] It follows that in a society where bankruptcy practices are widespread, Jewish law would incorporate such provisions under the doctrine of minhag ha-sochrim.^[65]

IV. What Counts as a Valid Minhag?

The previous section surveyed several applications of minhag ha-sochrim where halakhah incorporates commercial norms. As we shall see in this section, not every commercial practice constitutes a valid minhag. This section considers several criteria raised by poskim that bear on whether a commercial practice constitutes a binding minhag. The first consideration pertains to how prevalent and widespread the practice is within a community. A second consideration raised by poskim is whether the parties need to have knowledge of the custom when they do business before they can be bound by it. Third, poskim consider whether a “foolish” or “silly” commercial practice can be rejected as illegitimate. Fourth, does a practice need to gain support from communal leaders for it to count as valid?

A. The “Common and Frequent” Standard

In section I, we noted that minhag ha-sochrim differs from dina de-malkhuta dina. Whereas dina de-malkhuta is binding in virtue of it being the law, minhag ha-sochrim is binding in virtue of it being a practice adopted and taken up by a community. Thus, for minhag ha-sochrim to bind in any given case, the parties must be part of a group (industry, community, etc.) that has taken up the relevant custom. How widespread must the practice be for it to be considered taken up by a community? The Shulchan Arukh adopts the standard that to rise to the level of minhag, a practice must be common (שכיח) and frequent (נעשה הרבה פעמים). It is not sufficient that the practice was performed on a couple of occasions.^[66]

B. Must the Parties Have Knowledge of the Custom?

Some authorities hold that, in addition to being widespread, the custom must be known to the parties when they enter into their business agreement.^[67] Other authorities disagree. They counter that even when the parties are unaware of the custom, they nevertheless do business assuming that the ordinary norms of commerce will apply—whatever those norms may be.^[68]

C. “Improper” and “Foolish” Practices

Some poskim argue that even when a practice is widespread and frequent, it will not gain halakhic validity if it is “improper” or “foolish”. For example, the Talmud recognizes a concept of hezek re’iyah, which requires the construction of a privacy wall between neighbors.^[69] Under this rule, a property owner can compel his neighbor to bear half the costs of the wall. But what happens if the communal practice is to not abide by halakhah’s privacy rules (hezek re’iyah)—i.e., if the practice is to not build a privacy wall? Can the property owner still compel his neighbor to pay for half of the wall? Or does custom prevail?

Some authorities rule that such a practice is invalid because it is foolish or improper.^[70] Rashba, for example, explains that privacy regulations enshrine values of modesty (tzeni’ut) that affect the spiritual status of the entire Jewish people. Therefore, no community is authorized to waive hezek re’iyah regulations. Such a communal practice is invalid ab initio.^[71]

Other poskim disagree and maintain that any custom within the realm of monetary law (dinei mamonot) is valid, even if the custom is “improper” or “foolish”.^[72] They even hold that a communal custom to flout the Talmud’s privacy rules of hezek re’iyah is valid. In such a community, a neighbor will not be obligated to share the costs of a privacy wall.^[73]

D. An Established Practice Recognized by Scholars

Some poskim impose a further limitation on the set of halakhically valid commercial norms. Or Zarua’ suggests that a commercial custom is valid only if it was accepted by the community’s scholars.^[74] According to Or Zarua’, a commercial custom that never received the endorsement of the community’s scholars is not binding under Jewish law.

In theory, Or Zarua’s position might significantly limit minhag ha-sochrim. For it is rare for a commercial practice to gain official approval or recognition by Jewish law authorities. But Or Zarua’s position may be less limiting if it is satisfied by the practice having gained the tacit or implicit approval of communal scholars. For example, if rabbinic authorities have allowed their communities to adopt certain commercial practices, such as entering into contracts about futures and intangibles, declaring bankruptcy, or dividing their marital assets according to equitable distribution, these practices have, in effect, gained tacit approval of communal leaders.^[75] Furthermore, later authorities seem to reject Or Zarua’s position.^[76]

To briefly summarize this section, not every commercial practice constitutes a binding minhag ha-sochrim. The halakhic validity of a given commercial practice may depend on a) whether it has achieved widespread support, b) the parties’ knowledge of the custom and their intent to be bound by it, c) the appropriateness of the practice, and d) whether it has achieved the support of the community’s scholars.

V. The Normative Basis of Minhag Ha-Sochrim

This section examines the legal and conceptual basis for halakhah’s incorporation of minhag ha-sochrim. Sections A and B below develop and analyze two competing grounds for minhag ha-sochrim. Section A examines the theory that minhag ha-sochrim is grounded in the parties’ halakhic power to attach conditions and terms (tena’im) to their private agreements. Section B develops an alternative theory that grounds minhag ha-sochrim in the political power of a community to self-govern through binding legislation (rasha’in benei ha-‘ir le-hasi’a al kitzatan).

A. Stipulations in Monetary-Civil Law (Tenai Shel Mamon)

Some poskim write that minhag ha-sochrim is based in the halakhic principle of kol tenai shel mammon kayam.^[77] Under this principle, stipulations attached to a private agreement within monetary-civil law are generally binding, even if the stipulation runs contrary to the internal provisions of halakhah. For example, the liability rules of a bailee (shomer) are specified with great precision in Jewish law. Yet a bailor and bailee are free to stipulate and agree upon liability rules that run counter to the internal ones specified by Jewish law.^[78]

According to this view, the halakhic basis for minhag ha-sochrim is that parties to a financial agreement can explicitly stipulate a wide array of provisions (tena’im) that would override the default rules of choshen mishpat and mimic commercial practices like rent control, bankruptcy, equitable distribution, etc. This is the idea of kol tenai shel mamon kayam.

Minhag ha-sochrim simply extends this power to the realm of the implicit. Wherever there are prevailing commercial norms, the parties need not stipulate and agree to these provisions explicitly because they have implicitly adopted them by doing business within this commercial context. By entering into an agreement under these background conditions, it is as if the parties had explicitly adopted those provisions.^[79]

Grounding minhag ha-sochrim in the principle of tenai shel mammon explains how some commercial practices can become incorporated as implied terms in private agreements. It can explain, for instance, how the creditor is deemed to have agreed not to pursue the debt if the borrower has become bankrupt and why the landlord is deemed to have agreed to not raise the rent over a certain amount after the lease term.

But tenai shel mammon may fall short as an explanation for minhag ha-sochrim. Consider the fact that minhag ha-sochrim can generate novel forms of conveyance: It can generate new forms of kinyanim (i.e., situmta), and according to many authorities, it can validate transactions in futures and intangibles that would otherwise not be valid in Jewish law.^[80] Now it’s doubtful that two parties can originate a new form of kinyan by private agreement.^[81] Nor can a private agreement between themselves make binding a contract in futures or intangibles. Thus, minhag ha-sochrim appears to be different from the concept of an implied stipulation (tenai) in a private agreement. The latter is not strong enough to explain the former.

There is another reason to disentangle minhag ha-sochrim from the concept of implied conditions to private agreements. If minhag ha-sochrim works because it is an implied stipulation within a private agreement, it stands to reason that minhag ha-sochrim is limited to business relationships that arise by agreement—by contract. For where there is no agreement, there cannot be implied terms of the agreement. Thus, without an agreement or a contractual relationship, there is no basis to apply minhag ha-sochrim as an implied term. Yet, as we shall see below, some poskim apply minhag ha-sochrim to cases where no antecedent agreement exists between the parties.

These two considerations suggest that the conceptual and legal basis for minhag ha-sochrim may lie elsewhere.^[82]

B. Practices of the Townspeople as Equivalent to Takanah Legislation

A different basis for minhag ha-sochrim is suggested by commentators who ground minhag ha-sochrim in the halakhic power of townspeople to legislate and enact binding takanot for monetary matters. The core idea of this approach is that a widespread practice of the townspeople can achieve halakhic status equivalent to a takanah (legally binding rabbinic enactment). This interpretation of minhag ha-sochrim emerges from combining two well-established halakhic principles: (a) most fundamentally, the principle (Bava Batra 8b) that the townspeople are halakhically empowered to legislate binding takanot in the realm of monetary matters (rasha’in benei ha-’ir le-hasi’a al kitzatan), and (b) the principle (Bava Metzia 104a-b) that a widespread commercial practice amongst the townspeople should be treated as if it was enacted through formal legislation (darshinan lashon hedyot). Combining these two principles, we can conclude that a widespread commercial practice within a community can achieve the halakhic force of a takanah. Let us examine these two principles, in turn.

1. The Power of the Townspeople to Legislate (Bava Batra 8b)

The Talmud in Bava Batra (8b) and the Tosefta in Bava Metzia (Ch. 11) establish the halakhic power of the townspeople to enact binding legislation for monetary matters within their jurisdiction–even where the substance of their legislation diverges from the internal provisions of Jewish monetary law. Further, the townspeople are authorized to impose sanctions and penalties on members of the community who violate their enactments.

The Talmud and Tosefta offer several examples of binding communal legislation. The townspeople can enact legislation regulating the price of commodities and wages.^[83] They can declare social ownership over goods that enter the city.^[84] They can mandate insurance policies whereby each member of the town would be obligated to pay a premium to insure mercantile vessels and other means of private transportation.^[85] They can impose fines and penalties on the owners of animals that trespass through fields and vineyards.^[86] And they can regulate business and store hours to ensure fair competition and to distribute consumers between the different establishments.^[87]

What is the basis for the townspeople’s legislative power? Commentators explain that the townspeople themselves constitute a type of beit din with original legislative authority over the monetary affairs of their jurisdiction.^[88] Accordingly, the majority of the townspeople are halakhically authorized to enact monetary law takanot over their town.^[89] It follows, then, that if a community were to enact legislation about bankruptcy, rent control, equitable distribution of marital property, what counts as a means of conveyance, etc., those laws would become binding as valid communal takanot. But because these commercial practices are usually not legislated formally by the Jewish townspeople of a given community, the crucial question is whether these practices can rise to the level of a takanah without having been formally enacted by the legislative assembly of Jewish townspeople.^[90] This depends on the principle of darshinan lashon hedyot, which is the topic of the next section.

2. Granting Statutory Effect to Common Practice: Darshinan Lashon Hedyot (Bava Metzia 104)

The Talmud in Bava Metzia (104a) introduces the principle of darshinan lashon hedyot (which roughly translates to: “‘interpreting the language of commoners”). This principle requires batei din to give legal force to the prevalent business practices of the common people. To get better traction on the principle, let’s consider the Talmud’s examples of darshinan lashon hedyot.

In one example, the Talmud discusses sharecropping arrangements wherein the landlord grants a tenant the right to use and cultivate his land in exchange for a percentage of the crop yield. In such a relationship, the landlord incurs the risk of the tenant leaving the land fallow (resulting in no compensation for the landlord). To protect against this risk, it was common practice to include a provision requiring the tenant, should he leave the field fallow, to compensate the landlord “as if the field produced a full yield”.^[91] The Talmud proceeds to explain that even if the landlord forgot to include such a provision, the principle of darshinan lashon hedyot entitles the landlord to receive such compensation as if the provision was explicitly incorporated into the agreement.^[92] Darshinan lashon hedyot gives legal recognition to prevalent communal practices.

A second talmudic example of darshinan lashon hedyot relates to marriage agreements. A Jewish marriage consists of two stages: legal acquisition (kiddushin) and chuppah (nisu’in). In talmudic times the two stages occurred twelve months apart. The kiddushin, which is performed first, prohibits the wife to other men. The Talmud relates that it was common practice in Alexandria to condition the legal effect of kiddushin on the later occurrence of chuppah. This way, the kiddushin (and therefore the prohibition to other men) did not go into effect until chuppah occurred twelve months later. Thus, if the wife were to start a relationship with another man before the chuppah, she would not be considered adulterous.

Based on darshinan lashon hedyot, Hillel Ha-Zaken ruled that if an Alexandrian woman were to get married without explicitly stipulating such a condition, the kiddushin is nevertheless contingent on the chuppah, consistent with communal practice. The Talmud relates that Hillel actually exonerated, based on darshinan lashon hedyot, Alexandrian women who had started relationships with other men prior to their chuppah. Hillel also ruled that the children born from these unions were not mamzerim. He reasoned that their kiddushin were contingent on the occurrence of chuppah, even though the kiddushin of the women in question did not contain such a stipulation.^[93] Darshinan lashon hedyot gives legal effect to communal practices, even when the individual parties did not explicitly opt into it.

What legal or philosophical principle underlies darshinan lashon hedyot: Why are the parties bound by a common practice if they did not opt into it? Commentators explain that darshinan lashon hedyot enshrines the idea that a widespread communal practice (minhag) can be halakhically equivalent to a binding rabbinic enactment (takanah/ tenai beit din).^[94] The logic of this idea is straightforward. As we saw in the last section, the townspeople are authorized to formally enact communal takanot to regulate commerce (rasha’in benei ha-’ir le-has’ia al kitzatan). The principle of darshinan lashon hedyot extends this idea ever so slightly. It states that when a practice has taken hold in a community and has gained widespread support, it is as if the community has formally enacted it. After all, the significance of a formal enactment (takanah/ rasha’in benei ha’ir) is just that it reflects the community’s collective preference to adopt a certain ordinance or rule of conduct. Therefore, if the community has adopted a practice through its actual conduct—if that practice has gained widespread support—the practice has effectively been legislated by the community. So there is no fundamental difference between a takanah formally enacted by a community and a minhag that a community has adopted through its ongoing practice.^[95]

This provides us with our second basis for minhag ha-sochrim: Minhag ha-sochrim is binding because a widespread commercial practice has the force of a communally legislated ordinance (takanah).^[96] Locating minhag ha-sochrim in the power of the townspeople to legislate takanot for monetary matters explains some of the features of minhag ha-sochrim that could not be explained by the view that located it in tena’im (i.e., tenai shel mammon: attaching conditions to private agreements). A communally legislated takanah can validate novel methods of conveyance (kinyanim) as well as transfers in intangibles and futures. Moreover, a communally enacted takanah can impose commercial norms on the parties even when they lack a contractual relationship. This explains the position of Rashba and other authorities who apply minhag ha-sochrim to cases where no antecedent agreement exists between the parties. The view that locates minhag ha-sochrim in the power of parties to attach terms to their private agreements (tenai shel mammon) cannot explain this phenomenon. The next section discusses Rashba’s ruling and its consequences for determining the scope of minhag ha-sochrim.

VI. Disputes Arising from Non-Contractual Relationships

The previous section outlined two different bases for minhag ha-sochrim. The first conceptualizes minhag ha-sochrim as tenai shel mammon, an implied condition or term attached to a private agreement between two parties. The second conceptualizes minhag ha-sochrim as a type of communal takanah.

The clearest practical difference between the two theories is whether minhag ha-sochrim extends beyond contractual relationships. If minhag ha-sochrim is a term/condition in a private agreement, then it is limited to relationships governed by an agreement between the parties. For example, minhag ha-sochrim would apply to a partnership, an employment relationship, the sale of goods and services, and similar relationships governed by an initial agreement or meeting of minds between the parties. But it would not extend to claims that arise outside of contractual relationships.

If, however, minhag ha-sochrim is grounded in darshinan lashon hedyot and conceptualized as equivalent to a communal takanah, then minhag ha-sochrim should apply outside the domain of contracts as well. It should affect, for example, torts cases and claims of unjust enrichment, wherever those norms have achieved widespread support within the Jewish community.

Indeed, Rashba applies minhag ha-sochrim to resolve a dispute that involved no prior agreement or contract between the parties. In Rashba’s case, the plaintiff referred his friends to the defendant’s store, where they then purchased goods. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to a referral fee from the store owner, on the theory that it was “the custom and practice of shopkeepers to pay a referral fee to anyone who brought customers to their shop.” The defendant countered that he was not obligated to pay because he never agreed to pay it and never hired the plaintiff.^[97]

Rashba rules in favor of the plaintiff. He cites the custom and practice of shopkeepers and explains that under the principle of darshinan lashon hedyot, a widespread minhag is binding regardless of whether the person opted into it.^[98] Crucially, Rashba’s case involves no prior agreement between the plaintiff and defendant. There was no antecedent agreement between the parties through which they implicitly incorporated the custom and practice of shopkeepers as a term. The fact that Rashba rules on the basis of minhag ha-sochrim suggests that he conceptualizes minhag ha-sochrim as a communal ordinance—takanah or tenai beit din–and not as a term or condition embedded within a private agreement between two parties.

This suggests that minhag ha-sochrim may apply to tort cases as well. Consider an automobile accident between two Jewish parties. Should that dispute be governed by the internal tort principles of choshen mishpat or by the tort principles of the jurisdiction? According to Rashba’s ruling, and the theory that conceptualizes minhag ha-sochrim as equivalent to a communal takanah, it seems that if the tort principles of the jurisdiction have gained widespread support within the relevant Jewish community, then those principles may be relevant to deciding the dispute. To be sure, the Tosefta’s discussion of the townspeople’s power to enact communal ordinances (rasha’in benei ha-’ir le-hasi’a al kitzatan) includes examples of tort legislation.^[99]

VII. Minhag Ha-Sochrim as a Principle of Jewish Law

By this point, it should be clear that minhag ha-sochrim is a firmly entrenched principle of Jewish law. It appears explicitly in the Mishnah and Talmud, and it implicitly underlies several rulings throughout the Talmud.^[100] Furthermore, minhag ha-sochrim is consistently embraced by poskim throughout the ages who apply it to a wide range of cases.^[101] Thus, when a beit din decides a case based on minhag ha-sochrim, that decision is just as much a decision grounded in Torah law as one that appeals to other choshen mishpat principles such as chazakah, migo, and shevu’a. Put differently, minhag ha-sochrim is itself a provision of choshen mishpat, since it is Jewish law that provides for the incorporation of commercial customs, in the same way that it provides for chazakah, migo, and shevu’a. Thus, a beit din that fails to apply minhag ha-sochrim where it properly governs acts contrary to Jewish law. Such a beit din has erred by failing to apply the proper provision of choshen mishpat (i.e., minhag ha-sochrim) to the case.

Some readers might find it strange that Jewish law should be so amenable to incorporating commercial norms that displace the internal provisions of Jewish law. Bear in mind, however, that this concern is not unique to minhag ha-sochrim. As we saw, it is accepted halakhic doctrine that the townspeople are empowered to enact legislation in monetary matters that run contrary to the internal provisions of Jewish law.^[102] This parallels the rabbinic authority to enact takanot through hefker beit din that displace other internal provisions of Jewish law.^[103] It is also well-established that private parties can stipulate contrary to the internal provisions of Jewish law in their monetary agreements.^[104]

Some might object that if external commercial norms can displace the internal provisions of choshen mishpat, then there is hardly any room left for the “normal” halakhic provisions of choshen mishpat to apply. One response to this objection is that commercial norms do not automatically displace the provisions of Jewish law. Commercial norms are binding through minhag ha-sochrim only where the Jewish community has already adopted those practices.^[105] So the set of norms that could displace the internal provisions of choshen mishpat is always limited to those that have been taken up by the Jewish community. Moreover, as we saw earlier, minhag ha-sochrim may be limited in scope, based on several considerations, including: the propriety of the practice, whether the practice has gained the approval of communal scholars, and the parties’ knowledge of the practice.

It is sometimes objected that it is difficult to make sense of the prohibition against litigating in non-Jewish courts if a beit din would anyway decide the case according to commercial norms. There are two responses to this objection. First, whether and to what extent minhag ha-sochrim should govern a given case is itself a determination of Jewish law that can only be decided by a Jewish court. Sometimes minhag ha-sochrim is not at all relevant to a case, and sometimes it is relevant to only part of the case. But even where the entire case may turn on minhag ha-sochrim, that conclusion can only be reached by a beit din applying Jewish law to determine that in fact minhag ha-sochrim halakhically governs the case at bar.^[106]

Second, the prohibition against litigating in non-Jewish courts appears to be less about the outcome of a case and more about the impropriety of Jewish parties subjecting themselves to the legal authority of non-Jewish courts–that is, to a legal authority distinct from the Torah.^[107] When parties litigate in beit din they are subjecting themselves to the legal authority of the Torah. The dayanim then determine, as a matter of Jewish law, the extent to which Jewish law would incorporate the relevant commercial practices in light of the facts before them. If the dayanim determine that minhag ha-sochrim is relevant, they apply it as a provision internal to Jewish law. Thus, minhag ha-sochrim does not run afoul of the prohibition against litigating in non-Jewish courts.

Halakhah’s incorporation of commercial practices through minhag ha-sochrim may point to some broader themes of Jewish commercial law. On one level, it may reflect the principle that law should generally not upend the parties’ legitimate expectations. If the parties organized their business dealings according to norms that enjoy widespread support, then, to the extent possible, the law should uphold the parties’ expectations—even when they diverge from Jewish law’s internal provisions. Here minhag ha-sochrim can be understood as an equitable principle that protects the legitimate commercial expectations of the parties.^[108]

On a second level, minhag ha-sochrim may reflect halakhah’s recognition that commerce often takes place in a marketplace that cuts across different normative communities. People from different legal jurisdictions do business with each other: Sephardim do business with Ashkenazim, Jews do business with non-Jews. If Jewish law did not incorporate marketplace norms, every transaction would be simultaneously subject to multiple systems of law. This would make ordinary marketplace transactions more cumbersome and generate considerable uncertainty about which system of law controlled the deal. Minhag ha-sochrim streamlines commerce by allowing the prevailing norms of the marketplace to govern.^[109]

On a third level, minhag ha-sochrim may reflect Jewish law’s acknowledgement that commerce is dynamic and ever-changing, and that it would be exceedingly difficult to legislate iron-clad rules to govern all commercial transactions for all time and eternity.^[110] The marketplace is always in flux: with novel investment vehicles, new types of financial relationships, innovative methods of trading, emerging markets, and novel commodities. Now, Jewish law could engage with the dynamic marketplace by means of rabbinic takanot. The Talmud is full of such examples.^[111] But takanot require centralized rabbinic institutions and councils, which for chunks of Jewish history are either non-existent altogether or unavailable at the local level at which commercial practices vary. One way of thinking about minhag ha-sochrim is that it serves as an automatic mechanism, built into Jewish law, through which halakhah engages with a dynamic marketplace.^[112]

Summary

This Article has argued that minhag ha-sochrim is a fundamental principle of Jewish commercial law. Under the right conditions, minhag ha-sochrim recognizes the prevalent commercial practices of the marketplace as binding in Jewish law. Section I introduced minhag ha-sochrim as a principle of incorporation and showed how it differs from dina de-malkhuta dina. Section II established the talmudic basis for minhag ha-sochrim, demonstrating that it is firmly rooted in the talmudic case law. Section III surveyed applications of minhag ha-sochrim in the poskim. Section IV offered several criteria that may limit the scope of minhag ha-sochrim, including the prevalence of the practice, the propriety of the practice, the parties’ knowledge of the practice, and its endorsement by communal scholars. Section V explored two different conceptual bases for the normativity of minhag ha-sochrim: the power to attach conditions to private commercial agreements and the power of the townspeople to enact commercial legislation. Section VI discussed an important practical difference between these two bases: whether minhag ha-sochrim can be applied to disputes that arise outside of contracts, such as torts and claims of unjust enrichment. Section VII argued that minhag ha-sochrim is itself an internal provision of Jewish law. The section also responded to several concerns that arise in light of Jewish law incorporating commercial norms. Finally, the section pointed to several themes that may underlie minhag ha-sochrim. These include: giving legal recognition to the parties’ commercial expectations, facilitating commerce between parties subject to different or multiple legal jurisdictions, and allowing Jewish law to engage with the realities of modern commerce.

NOTES

[1] Rabbi Itamar Rosensweig is a dayan and chaver beth din at the Beth Din of America and a maggid shiur at Yeshiva University.

[2] Nedarim 28a, Rambam Gezelah 5:11.

[3] Bava Kamma 113b, Rambam Gezelah 5:17.

[4] Piskei Ri”az Bava Batra 3:36, Responsa Maharik 187.

[5] Sefer Ha-Terumot 46:8, Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 369.

[6] Shakh Choshen Mishpat 73:39.

[7] Or Zarua’ Bava Kamma no. 447, Nemukei Yosef Nedarim 10a.

[8] For statements emphasizing the wider scope of minhag ha-sochrim over dina de-malkhuta, see Iggerot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat I, 72, regarding rent control; Rabbi Y. L. Graubart, Chavalim Bene’imah Vol. 5, Even ha-Ezer 34, regarding the division of marital property:

אך נראה במדינה זו שע”פ דין הממשלה יש לאשה חלק שוה ברכוש הבעל וכל מי שחותם שטר נישואין יודע זאת ועל זה הוא חותם ברצונו, הרי זה שותפות גמורה… ואין זה ענין לדינא דמלכותא שיש דעות דמהני כמ”ש רמ”א… וכנגד זה ב”י חו”מ ס”ס כו… שדינא דמלכותא לאו דינא ושלא כד”ת…. דהכא שאני שכן המנהג והכל נוהגים כן…

And Pitchei Choshen Sekhirut 7 n. 17:

ובזמננו נהגו הבתי דינים לדון בקצת דיני ממונות עפ”י חוקי המדינה, ולכאורה יש לדון כן מצד דינא דמלכותא, ואף במקום דלא שייך דינא דמלכותא, כגון בא”י שי”א דלא אמרינן כן, וכן לדעת כמה אחרונים שבדיני ממונות שבין ישראל לחבירו לא אמרינן דינא דמלכותא… יש מקום לדון עפ”י החוק משום מנהג, וכן נהגו בתי דינים בא”י לדון בהרבה דיני שכירות עפ”י המנהג המבוסס על החוק, כגון דמי מפתח ופיצויי פיטורין וכדומה, ולכן נראה שבדברים שאינם שכיחים יש לדון עפ”י ד”ת ולא עפ”י החוק.

See also Pitchei Choshen Halva’ah 2:29 n. 72:

אף במקום שאין כח מדינא דמלכותא, כיון שנהגו כך, יש לזה תוקף עפ”י מנהג הסוחרים, וכל אחד סבור וקיבל עליו מנהג הסוחרים.

[9] Bava Metzia 83a:

מקום שנהגו שלא להשכים ושלא להעריב אינו רשאי לכופן. מקום שנהגו לזון יזון, לספק במתיקה יספק, הכל כמנהג המדינה.

[10] Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 331:1:

השוכר את הפועלים ואמר להם… אני שוכר אתכם כדין תורה, חייבין לצאת מביתם בזריחת השמש ולעשות מלאכה עד צאת הכוכבים.

[11] Ibid:

לא היה מנהג בעיר… חייבין לצאת מביתם בזריחת השמש ולעשות מלאכה עד צאת הכוכבים.

[12] Bava Metzia 83a-b; Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 331:1-2.

It’s striking that the Talmud takes it as obvious that custom would override the “din Torah” workday. Immediately following its presentation of the “din Torah” workday, the Talmud wonders if it is ever relevant given that communities typically have customary work hours. The Talmud responds that the din Torah workday is relevant either in a new settlement lacking commercial norms or in a case where the employer and employee agree to define the workday by “din Torah”. See Bava Metzia 83b:

פועל, בכניסתו משלו, ביציאתו משל בעל הבית, שנאמר תזרח השמש יאספון ואל מעונתם ירבצון יצא אדם לפעלו ולעבדתו עדי ערב. וליחזי היכי נהיגי! בעיר חדשה… איבעית אימא, דאמר להו: דאגריתו לי כפועל דאורייתא.

And note Mordekhai’s comment (Bava Batra no. 477):

ופריך וניחזי היכי נהוג אלמא מנהג בני העיר דוחה את דין חכמי התלמוד אף על פי שמצאו לו סמך מן המקרא.

Furthermore, according to some commentators, the din Torah work hours are structured to allow the worker to daven before work. See, e.g., Torat Chayim, Bava Metzia 83a. On this view, the din Torah workday is not defined arbitrarily. And nevertheless, custom prevails.

[13] Minhag ha-medinah features prominently in other talmudic cases as well. In the same Mishnah (Bava Metzia 83a), R. Shimon ben Gamliel holds that custom can limit the amount of food an employer is obligated to provide his Jewish workers—even if halakhah would otherwise require that he provide them with significantly more:

מעשה ברבי יוחנן בן מתיא שאמר לבנו: צא שכור לנו פועלין. הלך ופסק להם מזונות. וכשבא אצל אביו, אמר לו: בני, אפילו אם אתה עושה להם כסעודת שלמה בשעתו לא יצאת ידי חובתך עמהן, שהן בני אברהם יצחק ויעקב. אלא, עד שלא יתחילו במלאכה צא ואמור להם: על מנת שאין לכם עלי אלא פת וקטנית בלבד.

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר: לא היה צריך לומר, הכל כמנהג המדינה.

In Bava Metzia 93a, the Mishnah rules that custom would permit a produce watchman to eat from the produce he guards, even though there is no right within Jewish law to do so. See Rashi s.v. me-hilkhot medinah and Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 337:6.

In Bava Batra 2a, the Mishnah holds that a privacy wall between abutting lots should be constructed to the specifications of local custom. According to some authorities, this example provides us with another striking illustration of minhag overriding the internal provisions of choshen mishpat. The Talmud provides a homeowner with the right to compel his neighbor to pay for half the costs of the privacy wall. Yet some commentators hold that a regional custom to forego privacy walls could defeat the halakhic right to one. See Rabbenu Yonah, Bava Batra 2a:

ואשמעינן תנא דמתני’, שיכול כל אחד לכוף את חבירו מן הדין לבנות עמו כותל, ולסלק היזק ראיה. אבל במקום שנהגו כולם שלא לבנות, שאין מקפידין על הזק ראיה, אין מחייבין אותו לבנות.

See also Or Zarua’ Bava Batra no. 2. For views that conceptualize hezek re’iyah as either a matter of ritual law or public policy, and therefore not waivable by minhag, see Yad Ramah Bava Batra 4a; Yad Ramah Bava Batra 60a; and Shut Rashba 2:268. See also Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 157:1.

Here are some further examples where minhag is decisive in monetary law: The Mishnah in Bava Metzia 103a rules that regional custom governs the allocation of agricultural responsibilities between a landlord and a tenant-sharecropper.

In Bava Metzia 110a, the Talmud considers a case of a sharecropper and a landlord who dispute the terms of their profit sharing agreement. Rav Nachman rules that a court should decide such a case by distributing the crop yield in accordance with the prevailing regional custom.

Minhag also plays a central role in allocating tax burdens for public goods and other communal costs. See Bava Kamma 116b. As Mordekhai rules on the basis of that talmudic passage (Bava Batra 475):

וששאלתם אם יש לתת מס מן הבתים אם לאו זה הכלל הכל לפי מנהג העיר כדתניא בפ’ הגוזל בתרא שיירא שהיתה מהלכת במדבר ועמד עליה גייס לטורפה מחשבין לפי ממון ואין מחשבין לפי נפשות ואם שכרו תייר לפניהם מחשבין אף לפי נפשות ובלבד שלא ישנו ממנהג החמרים אלמא אזלינן בתר מנהג ותניא נמי התם ספינה שהיתה מהלכת בים ועמד עליה נחשול של ים לטובעה והקילו ממשאם מחשבין לפי משאוי ואין מחשבין לפי ממון ובלבד שלא ישנו מנהג הספנים אלמא בתר מנהג אזלינן.

Mordekhai (Bava Batra 477) also rules that regional custom overrides the din Torah rule for determining which residents are obligated to shoulder the costs of public goods. According to the Talmud (Bava Batra 8a) a resident becomes liable to participate in the communal security tax only after residing in the town for twelve months. But Mordekhai holds that local custom can obligate the resident even sooner:

והרב ר’ אביגדור כהן השיב וזה לשונו איש הבא אל עיר נושבת יהודים אם צריך ליתן מס תוך שנים עשר אם מנהג קבוע שם לחובה איני יודע לפוטרו כדתנן פרק הפועלים הכל כמנהג המדינה.

For Minhag’s role in governing the monetary obligations of the Ketubah, see e.g., Mishnah Ketubot 6:4, and Shulchan Arukh Even Ha-Ezer 80:1.

[14] See Shita Mekubetzet Bava Metzia 87a citing R. Yehonatan’s second interpretation of the Yerushalmi:

יש לפרש זה הירושלמי על משנתנו שאומרת מקום שנהגו שלא להשכים ושלא להעריב כלומר שאין יוצאין הפועלים למלאכתן אלא עד אחר חצי שעה לזריחת השמש ושיוצאין ממלאכתן קודם שעה אחת לשקיעת החמה עושין ואף על פי שפועל הכתוב בתורה הוא מזריחת השמש עד שקיעת החמה דמנהג מבטל הלכה.

[15] The language of the Yerushalmi–minhag mevatel halakhah–might lead some readers to conclude that halakhah’s incorporation of minhag is somehow contrary to halakhah. But this is erroneous since the Yerushalmi is clearly stating a halakhic position requiring the incorporation of minhag. It is paradoxical to say that “halakhah requires that we follow minhag rather than halakhah”. For that statement itself appears to be a statement of halakhah. It is better, therefore, to translate minhag mevatel halakhah as “custom overrides what would otherwise be the halakhah.” Put differently, custom displaces the internal provisions of Jewish law that would normally apply.

[16] Tamud Yerushalmi Bava Metzia 7:1:

אמר רב הושעיה זאת אומרת המנהג מבטל את ההלכה א”ר אימי כל המוציא מחבירו עליו להביא ראייה חוץ מזו.

See the first interpretation R. Yehonatan cited in the Shita Mekubetzet Bava Metzia 87a:

והולכים אחר המנהג… וזה פירוש הירושלמי שהביא הריא”ף מנהג מבטל הלכה אף על פי שהלכה רווחת היא המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה, וכן השוכר טוען בפחות שבשכירות רצית לומר הבינותי מדבריך והפועל אומר לא נתכוונתי אלא על הגדול שבשכירות היה לנו לומר המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה ולא יתן לו אלא כפי הפחות לפיכך בא המנהג שבדרך בעלי בתים לפעמים לשכור ביוקר ועל כן היה לו לבעל הבית לפרש דבריו ולא עשה יפסיד.

[17] See, for example, Kiddushin 26a and 25b.

[18] See Bava Metzia 74a:

אמר רב פפי משמיה דרבא: האי סיטומתא קניא… באתרא דנהיגו למקני ממש – קנו.

For the interpretation of situmta as marking wine barrels, see Rashi Bava Metzia 74a s.v. situmta. Other commentators offer different interpretations of the actual commercial practice described by situmta. Rosh cites an opinion that situmta is a handshake performed between the buyer and seller. See Rosh Bava Metzia 5:72:

ור”ח פי’ כדרך שנהגו הסוחרים בגמר המקח תוקע כפו לכף חבירו ובזה נגמר המקח.

The underlying point remains the same: Jewish law incorporates the recognized commercial method of conveyance.

For a narrower interpretation of situmta, see Ritva Bava Metzia 74a, citing R. Pinchas.

[19] See, e.g., Rashba Bava Metzia 74a s.v. u-veduchta, concluding from the Talmud’s discussion of situmta that:

ושמעינן מינה שהמנהג מבטל ההלכה וכל כיוצא בזה, שכל דבר שבממון על פי המנהג קונין ומקנין הלכך בכל דבר שנהגו התגרים לקנות קונין.

See also Tosefta Bava Batra 4:8:

המוכר את הראש בבהמה דקה לא מכר את הלחי ואם היה טבח כהן הרי זה מכור, המוכר את הראש בבהמה גסה לא מכר את הרגלים מקום שנהגו למכור הרי אילו מכורות.

And see Rashbam Bava Batra 83b s.v. lo makhar.

[36] See Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 209:4-5.

[37] See, respectively, Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 212:1-2, Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 157:2, and Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 207. For a general overview, see Pitchei Choshen Kinyanim, chapters 19 and 21.

[38] See Tosafot Bava Metzia 66a:

ומניומי אמר אסמכתא לא קניא… אסמכתות אפי’ מעכשיו לא קני… ומיהו קנס שעושין בשעת שידוכין מהני אפילו לא קנו בב”ד חשוב כיון שנוהגין בו כל העולם מידי דהוי אסיטומתא דלקמן (דף עד.) דקניא.

See also Or Zarua’ Bava Metzia no. 188:

ובפרק זה בורר פירשתי עוד ענין אסמכתא. כתב רבינו שמשון בר אברהם זצ”ל אותם ריישמיינש שנותנין בשעת שידוכין קניא שתקנום העולם. כדאמ’ בסוף פרקין שקונין במנהג. וגם כמו כן יש להועיל דיישמינש בשידוכין כיון שכל העולם נוהגין ליתן אותם בשידוכין.

[39] Responsa Rosh 13:21:

ומה שטענו המורשין לבטל החכירות משום דהוי דבר שלא בא לעולם ומשום דאין אדם מקנה לחברו דבר שאינו ברשותו, בזה אני מודה לדבריהם. דמדין תורה אין קנין נתפס בחכירות, דאפי’ חוב גמור אין אדם יכול להקנות חובו לחברו אפי’ בקנין דמלוה להוצאה ניתנה ואין דבר שיחול עליו הקנין… וכל שכן חכירות אלמעונה דשנה הוי דבר שלא בא לעולם ודבר שאינו ברשותו.

אלא שאני רואה מנהג הארץ כל היום שחוכרין זה מזה ואין בו חזרה. וכן הודו המורשין דבחתימת ההורדה ובמסירתה למוכר מתקיימת החכירות, וכיון שנהגו כן הוי קנין דאין בו חזרה. כדאמרינן בפרק איזהו נשך (ע”ד) אמר רב פפי האי סיטומתא קניא, ופירש רש”י ז”ל רושם שרושמין החנונים על החביות שלוקחין מבעלי בתים. ורבינו חננאל ז”ל פירש כדרך שנהגו הסוחרים בגמר המקח תוקע כפו לכף חברו ובזה נגמר המקח. ופסק ר”י ז”ל כיוצא באיזה דבר שנהגו לגמור המקח כגון במקום שנוהגים שנותן הלוקח מטבע אחד למוכר ובזה נקנה המקח הכל כמנהג המדינה לענין גמר המקח.

[40] Tashbetz Katan no. 398:

מהר”ם אמר אדם הנודר לחבירו ליתן לו בנו למול או להיות בעל ברית שצריך לקיים לו. ואף על גב דאמרינן דאין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם בכאן שהוא מנהג בני אדם שנודרין בניהם זה לזה למול או להיות בעל ברית ומקיימין. גם בכאן יש לקיים. כדאיתא בבבא מציעא (דף עד) האי סיטומתא קני פי’ רושם של חביות וכו’ ובאתרא דנהיגי למקני ממש קנין. כלומר הסיטומתא בשביל שהוא מנהג אף בכאן הואיל ומנהג הוא כמו שפירשתי צריך לקיים.

For an objection to Tashbetz’s extension, see R. Yechiel of Paris’s gloss on the spot. But see Responsa Chatam Sofer 5:66, who sees no fundamental disagreement between the two authorities.

[41] Shut Maharshal 36:

דומה קניין זה של יין שרף, שהוא רק רשות, לדבר שאין בו ממש מתרי טעמי חדא דאין בו ממש רק רשות וגרוע יותר מדירה שפסקו בהג”ה מיימוני ר”ח והגאונים שקרוי דבר שאין בו ממש… כ”ש הכא דאין באותו הקנין שום דבר אפי’ דירה רק רשות וכח שלא יעשה שום אדם יין שרוף זולתו, ועוד הוא דבר שאין בו ממש שלא בא לעולם עדיין והוה כמו פירות דקל, ועוד ריעותא שמוכרים היין שרף באותו זמן שאינו ברשותם [כי נמכר לאדם אחר עד איזה זמן] וכל דבר שאין ברשות של אדם קרוי דבר שאין בו ממש כמו מה שאירש מאבא כו’ כדאיתא פ”ק דב”מ (ט”ז) וכן פסק הרמב”ם וכל הגאונים.

[42] ibid:

ומה שאינו מקח ממש אמרו ג”כ חכמים שהוא קנין גמור בסוף פ’ הריבית (ע”ד) גבי סטומתא וכן כתב האשר”י בפ”ק דב”מ וז”ל כי הקניין לפי המנהג כדאמר לקמן גבי סטומתא ומזה הביאו ראייה המחברים שעיקר קנינים בין בסחורה הכל לפי המנהג ק”ו מנהג ודת המלך וגדולה מזו כתב במרדכ”י פרק המקבל וא”ז פרק הפועלין הטוען תמורת המנהג אפילו במיגו אינו מהימן אלמא דמנהג עיקר לעניין משא ומתן.

הילכך הנראה בעיני מי שקונה מכס או כה”ג מן המלך אפי’ קודם זמנו הוא קניין גמור והנוטלה ממנו הוא גזל גמור ויוצאת בדיינים.

[43] See Bava Batra 111b, Shulchan Arukh Even Ha-Ezer 90:1.

[44] Responsa Rashba 6:254:

שאלת מעשה היה בפירפינייאן בראובן שהשיא את בתו לאה לשמעון והכניס לו עמה סך ממון בנידוניא וילדה לו בת ואח”כ מתה לאה ואחר זמן מתה ג”כ הבת שילדה לו
ועכשיו עמד ראובן ותבע בדיני הגויים שיחזיר לו אותו ממון הנדוניא שהכניס לו עם לאה בתו. ואעפ”י שהבעל יורש את אשתו והאב את בתו בדיני ישראל טוען ואומר שאין לחוש לירושת הבעל כיון שהכל יודעי’ שהם הולכים בדיני הגויים והרי כל הנושא אשה שם כאילו התנה כן.

[45] Ibid:

תשובה כל דבר שבממון תנאו קיים ובאמת אמרו שמתנין בכענין זה וכדאמרי’ בירושלמי הני דכתבין אין מיתת בלא בנים תהדיר מוהרא לבי נשא תנאי ממון וקיים. ומוסיף אני על זה שבכ”מ שנהגו להתנות ולעשות כזה תנאי אפי’ הנושאים שם סתם גובין מהם אם מתה בלא בנים שכל הנושא סתם ע”ד הנוהג שם בישראל נושא וזהו שקראוה בפ’ המקבל דרישת הדיוט.

Rashba raises the further question of whether it is wrongful for a community to adopt a custom that runs contrary to the internal provisions of Jewish law. Here Rashba replies that it is wrongful only if the reason for the community adopting the practice is to imitate gentile practices:

ומ”מ לנהוג כן מפני שהוא משפט גויים באמת נ”ל שאסור לפי שהוא מחקה את הגויים.

If the custom was adopted for other reasons, say economic efficiency or considerations of equity, the practice would not be wrongful. In any event, Rashba appears to hold that the minhag would be binding even in the cases where it was wrongful for the community to adopt it. See note 10 in the Machon Yerushalayim edition of the responsum.

[46] In another responsum (6:224), Rashba was asked about an aide who had set sail with an emissary of the king. The king’s emissary had died mid-journey, causing the mission to be prematurely terminated. The aide sued to be compensated in full, arguing that it was no fault of his own that the mission was terminated and that, as far as he was concerned, he was willing to see the mission through to completion. Rashba ruled that regardless of the internal rules of Jewish commercial law on the matter, the aide is entitled to be fully compensated, since the minhag ha-sochrim was to pay full compensation in such cases:

דאפי’ לא יהי’ הדין נותן כן כיון שמנהג מפרשי ימים כן שם הכל הולך אחר המנהג.

[47] For an overview, see Pitchei Choshen Yerushah ve-Ishut, chapter 8.

[48] See Rabbi Mordechai Willig, “Equitable Distribution and the Enforceability of Choice of Law Clauses in Beit Din”, Journal of the Beth Din of America 3:

“the common custom is… binding on parties who implicitly adopt it, and a beit din must honor the common custom by dividing the couple’s marital property in accordance with the principles of equitable distribution.”

See also Rabbi Y .L. Graubart, Chavalim Bene’imah Vol. 5, Even ha-Ezer 34. R. Graubart argues that within jurisdictions that treat marital property as joint property, Jewish law should recognize that property as jointly owned by the couple, based on minhag:

אך נראה במדינה זו שע”פ דין הממשלה יש לאשה חלק שוה ברכוש הבעל וכל מי שחותם שטר נישואין יודע זאת ועל זה הוא חותם ברצונו, הרי זה שותפות גמורה… ואין זה ענין לדינא דמלכותא שיש דעות דמהני כמ”ש רמ”א… וכגנגד זה ב”י חו”מ ס”ס כו… שדינא דמלכותא לאו דינא ושלא כד”ת…. דהכא שאני …שכן המנהג והכל נוהגים כן

See also Rabbi Chaim Jachter, “Beit Din, Marital Finances in Light of Contemporary Arrangements,” Grey Matter III.

[49] For further examples of custom modifying the halakhic rules of marital property, see Rif Yevamot 22a (Alfasi), who rules that the husband’s responsibility for the wife’s nichsei tzon barzel (i.e., the documented assets the wife brings into the marriage) is determined by minhag, not by the talmudic rule:

מיהו אף על גב דדינא דגמרא הכי לא מחייבינן ליה לבעל השתא בכחישה וביתרות דמים דכיון דלא נהגי עלמא הכי כל מאן דמקבל לנכסי צאן ברזל וכתב להו עליה אדעתא דמנהגא הוא דמקבל להו עליה הילכך לא מיחייב אלא לפום מנהגא.

[50] Responsa Maharshakh 2:229:

נפל ההפרש בין יורשי ראובן לשמעון, ורוצים לחייבו לעמוד בדין הסוחרים שידונו ביניהם כמנהג ויניציאה, יען כי העסק שעשה ראובן אביהם נ”ע עם שמעון הנז’ היה שם, מאן לימא לן שיוכלו לחייבו על כך ושלא יוכל שמעון לטעון כי אם יש להם איזה הפרש ותביעה שידונו על פי התורה כפי מקום התביעה.

[51] Ibid:

כד מעיינן שפיר יראה דקושטא דמלתא היא שיכולים יורשי ראובן לכוף לשמעון לדון בדין הסוחרים על פי מנהג ויניציאה, כיון שנעשה שם העסק… [ו]נצרף עוד טעם לשבח, ונאמר שהדבר ידוע דבענייני הקניות והסחורות וכל ענייני משא ומתן שנהגו הסוחרים בעסקיהם, יש לנו ללכת אחרי מנהגיהם, ואפילו בסתם מנהג. ועיקר דין זה נלמד מהא דאמר רב פפא פרק איזהו נשך [ב”מ עה ע”א] האי סיטומתא באתרא דרגילי למקני קני.

[52] Ibid:

הדבר היה ידוע שאם אותו העסק והמאורעות שאיפשר שיארעו באותו העסק היו נידונים בדין תורה, הניח מעותיו על קרן הצבי ויאכל הלה וחדי, ובלי ספק לא היה ראובן עושה עסק עמהם.

[53] Ibid:

מאחר שראובן נשא ונתן עם שמעון במקום שנהגו שלא יצטרכו בעסקיהם לדון בדין תורה, שהיה מן הנמנעות לישא וליתן ויבטל העסק והמשא ומתן, היתכן שנאמר שישא ויתן על סמך אותו המנהג והדבר היה ידוע שאם אותו העסק והמאורעות שאיפשר שיארעו באותו העסק היו נידונים בדין תורה, הניח מעותיו על קרן הצבי ויאכל הלה וחדי, ובלי ספק לא היה ראובן עושה עסק עמהם. ואם כן היעלה על הדעת שהיה עושה עסק עמו על סמך אותו המנהג שבאותו מקום, ואחר כך יצא למקום אחר ויפשוט לו את הרגל ויאמר אין רצוני לדון ע”פ המנהג מקום המשא ומתן אלא כפי מקום התביעה, אם כן איפה לא שבקת חיי לכל בריה.

Maharshakh’s language implies that the rationale for relying on minhag ha-sochrim, at least in the case before him, is one of fairness: It would be unfair to allow the defendant to wiggle out of a partnership agreement that all parties assumed would be governed by minhag through asserting, ex post facto, that it must be governed by din Torah. If this is correct, then at least one underlying theme of minhag ha-sochrim is the halakhah’s desire to not frustrate the commercial expectations of the parties when their expectations are consistent with universal practice.

[54] R. Akiva Eger Choshen Mishpat 3:1:

על מחלוקת בין תובע לנתבע א’ אומר שרצונו להתדיין בד”ת וא’ אומר שאין לו להתדיין אלא בפני אחרים שכך הוא המנהג במקום שנעשה העסק הדין עמו. כיון דבמקום שנעשה העסק יש מנהג להתדיין כפי דרך הסוחרי’ ולא כפי ד”ת מנהג מבטל הלכה והביא ההיא דאסטימת’.

[55] This is implied by Maharshakh’s order to conduct the adjudication according to dinei ha-sochrim. See also the formulation in the Pitchei Teshuvah (Choshen Mishpat 3:2):

האחד אומר שאין לו להתדיין רק בדיני סוחרים שכך הוא המנהג במקום שנעשה העסק. הדין עם השני, כיון דבמקום שעשה העסק יש מנהג להתדיין כפי דרך הסוחרים ולא כפי דין תורה.

[56] R. Akiva Eger Choshen Mishpat 3:1:

See also Responsa Tzitz Eliezer 11:93. For further discussion about Jewish law’s position on arbitration before non-Jewish arbitrators, see Rabbi Yaakov Feit, “The Prohibition Against Going to Secular Courts,” Journal of the Beth Din of America 1, p. 41.

[57] See Pitchei Choshen Sekhirut Chapter 5:5 and note 10 therein, and Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 312:8.

[58] Iggerot Moshe Choshen Mishpat I, 72:

בענין דינא דמלכותא קשה לכתוב בענינים אלו… מטעם שכתב בשו”ת השיב משה שהביא כתר”ה שיש מבוכה רבה בין הפוסקים וסתירות רבות וצריך לזה עיון וזמן רב אולי יעזור ה’ להבין לאסוקי להלכה וכ”ש לקטני ערך כמוני.

[59] Ibid:

והגע עצמך דהא ברור ופשוט שכל אלו הדינים התלויין במנהג המדינה… א”צ שיעשה המנהג ע”פ חכמי תורה וגם אף לא ע”פ יהודים דוקא דאף שהנהיגו זה הנכרים כגון שהם רוב תושבי העיר נמי הוא מדין התורה בסתמא כפי המנהג דאדעתא דמנהג העיר נחשב כהתנו בסתמא.

וכן הוא בעניני מכירה מה הוא בכלל המכר שאף שאיכא דינים קבועים בפרקי המכירה בב”ב מה הוא בכלל המכירה מפורש ברמב”ם ס”פ כ”ו ממכירה ובש”ע חו”מ סי’ רי”ח סעי’ י”ט דהוא רק במקום שאין מנהג אבל במקום שיש מנהג הולכין אחר המנהג והטעם שבסתמא הוא כהתנו שהוא כהמנהג ולכן אין חלוק מי הם שהנהיגו דאף אם הנכרים שהם רוב תושבי העיר הנהיגו, נידון בדין התורה בסתמא כהמנהג.

[60] Under the rule of shemitat kesafim, the seventh year cancels debts. But note that shemitah only cancels loans, not other forms of liabilities, and that shemitah can be avoided by pruzbul, and that it depends on the biblical force of shemitah. See generally, Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 67.

[61] See, e.g., Pitchei Choshen Halva’ah 2:26:

אפילו כשאין לו עכשיו במה לפרוע אינו נפטר לעולם מלפרוע החוב.

[62] For the view that dina de-malkhuta cannot recognize bankruptcy laws, see Rabbi Breisch, Responsa Chelkat Yaakov, Choshen Mishpat, no. 32:

פה במדינות אירופא, מנהג ודין הערכאות, באם אחד פושט רגל הנקרא באנקראט או נאחלאס, אם רוב מהבעלי חובות מסכימים לקבל האחוזים מהרכוש שיש לו להלוה, בית המשפט מאשר זאת גם להמיעוט שלא הסכימו ע”ז או לא השיבו כלל ע”ז….[ו]לאחר שקיבל האחוזים שלו, וויתר על המותר ואין לו עוד רשות לתבוע מהלוה אף כשיהי’ לו אח”כ רכוש גדול, וזהו האופן דני”ד. וכמובן דזה נגד דין תורה שלנו, דכ”ז שלא מחל בפירוש להלוה, פשיטא דעפ”י דיננו יכול לתבוע מהלוה מה שמגיע לו, ובאנו לזה אם בכה”ג שייך דינא דמלכותא דינא.

ונבאר קצת, בדברי הראשונים יש שיטות שונות בדדמ”ד – יש מהסוברים דלא אמרינן דדמ”ד רק בדברים השייכים לקרקע – ויש סוברים דדוקא בדברי מסים וארנונות – ויש הסוברים דדוקא בדברים הנוגעים לתועלת המלך – ויש שסוברים שגם בשארי דברים השייכים להנהגת המדינה אמרינן דדמ”ד…

נמצינו למדין, בני”ד לכל השיטות אין לנו להשגיח על דין דערכאות שהוא נגד דין התורה, ולומר שהוא מחל על ממונו, אף שלא מחל לעולם, רק מפני שהערכאות פוסקין כן, אם כן יבטול כל דיני התורה.

One of the more surprising claims in this responsum is the assertion that bankruptcy laws provide no benefit to society and therefore do not qualify for dina de-malkhuta:

ואף להרמ”א המרים ביותר הגדר דדמ”ד, דאף משום תקנת בני המדינה אמרינן דדמ”ד, בני”ד איזו תקנת בני המדינה יש בזה לגזול ממונו מפני שאין ללוה לשעה לשלם, אח”כ ישלם וישלם, לא תהיה לו כנושה בשעה שאין לו כתוב בתוה”ק, אבל לא שיופטר מפני זה לשלם אף כשיש לו אחר כך.

Economists and legislators generally agree that bankruptcy laws benefit society. These benefits include: incentivizing risk-taking that powers the economy, providing bankrupt individuals a fresh start free from crushing debt, and coordinating collection rights amongst competing creditors seeking to collect from an insolvent debtor.

[63] Pitchei Choshen Halva’ah, Chapter 2 note 63:

יש לדון במה שידוע כיום מושג של פושט רגל, והיינו כשיש לאדם או לחברה חובות שאינו יכול לעמוד בהם, יש שבערכאות על פי תנאים מסוימים מכריזים עליו כפושט רגל, שנכסיו נמסרים לכונס נכסים, ולאחר ריכוז כל נכסיו וכל חובותיו מחלקים לכל נושה חלק מנכסיו לפי אחוזים של כלל הנושים ביחס לכלל הנכסים, ולאחר כמה הגבלות שיש על פושט הרגל מכאן ולהבא, הוא נפטר מלשלם חובותיו, ויש לדון מה דינו עפ”י דין תורה… וכן אם מועיל הפטור עפ”י ערכאות מדינא דמלכותא או מנהג המדינה. ואקדים קצת מדיני פשרה ומחילה הנוגעים לעניננו. …

אלא שיש להסתפק בזמננו שענין פשיטת רגל מקבל תוקף עפ”י ערכאות, אם יש לומר בזה דינא דמלכותא, ומשמע מדברי הפוסקים שבכה”ג בדבר שאין ענין למלכות לא שייך דינא דמלכותא לדון על פיהם בין ישראל לחבירו… שאין בזה משום דינא דמלכותא אלא גזילה, וכמ”ש בשו”ת מהרי”ל סימן עח והובא בב”י חו”מ סימן קכח בשם מ”כ.

מיהו אפשר שיש לדון על פי מנהג המדינה…ונראה הטעם דעיקר תוקף מנהג הוא משום שמסתמא על דעת המנהג מתעסקים…

בחידושי רעק”א סימן יב סעיף יג כתב בשם שו”ת משאת משה שבעלי חוב שהסכימו להתפשר עם הלוה ואחד אינו מסכים, כופין אותו להתפשר משום שכן מנהג הסוחרים, ואפילו היה לחייב קצת נכסים והסכימו בעלי החובות להרחיב לו אולי יחון ה’ אותו, כופין את שאינו רוצה, ויש להם על מה שיסמוכו מדין סיטומתא, הרי שגם בזה הולכין אחר המנהג… וכ”ש לגבי חברה בע”מ שכל המושג וכל עניני הכספים של חברה מתנהלים מכח החוק ומנהג המדינה, הרי זה כאילו על דעת כן מתעסקים.

[64] Responsa Maharshakh 2:113; R. Akiva Eger Choshen Mishpat 12:13:

בבע”ח שהסכימו לפשר עם הלוה וא’ אינו מסכים עמהם מכמי אנפי רואה אני לכוף את הממאן להתפשר כשאר הסוחרים שהם הרוב כי מנהג הסוחרים לכוף את שאינו רוצה לבוא בפשרה ויש להם על מי שיסמוכו מההיא דאסטותא.

[65] Would minhag ha-sochrim incorporate statutes of limitations? Jewish law does not impose time limits after which a litigant is barred from bringing their claim. But most secular-law jurisdictions do. Pitchei Choshen (Halva’ah Chapter 2 note 72) suggests that even if dina de-malkhuta dina cannot incorporate such laws, minhag ha-sochrim would:

ובזמננו קיים בכמה מדינות חוק התיישנות, והיינו שאם עבר זמן מסוים (זמנים שונים לכל סוג חוב) ולא תבעו שוב אינו יכול לתבוע, ומסתבר שמדין תורה אינו נפטר מכח החוק… ובשו”ת מהרש”ם ח”ה סימן מה. ובהשמטות לאורחוה”מ לכלל דינא דמלכותא הביא בשם רב פעלים שאף במקום שאין כח מדינא דמלכותא, כיון שנהגו כך, יש לזה תוקף עפ”י מנהג הסוחרים, וכל אחד סבור וקיבל עליו מנהג הסוחרים, עיין שם.

[66] Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 331:1:

ואינו קרוי מנהג אלא דבר השכיח ונעשה הרבה פעמים, אבל דבר שאינו נעשה רק פעם אחת או שני פעמים אינו קרוי מנהג.

See also Terumat Ha-Deshen no. 342, who requires the custom to be “regular and widespread”:

צריכים לידע דמנהג קבוע ופשוט הוא.

See also Responsa Hacham Tzvi (no. 61) who suggests that the minhag needs to be practiced regularly and daily. See Pitchei Choshen Sekhirut 7, n. 17:

בשו”ת חכ”צ (סימן סא) …משמע … שכל מנהג צריך להיות שכיח כשכירות פועלים שהוא דבר המצוי בכל יום.

[67] See Shakh Choshen Mishpat 42:36:

משמע בפשיטות דהיינו דוקא שידוע שידע מזה.

Rabbi Shlomo Daikhovsky, “Abrogation of Contract between Contractor and Tenant”, Tehumin 4 (1983), 378 (Heb.).

[68] See, e.g., Pitchei Choshen Sekhirut 7, n. 17:

ונראה שבדיני ממונות… שאמרו הלך אחר המנהג הוא משום שמסתמא ע”ד מנהג המקום עושים… ואף על פי שגם אם אינו יודע המנהג אמרינן כן, היינו משום שמסתמא סומך על המנהג.

See also Rabbi Ya‘akov Eli‘ezerov, “Abrogation of Contract between Contractor and Tenant,” Tehumin 4 (1983), 369 (Heb.).

[69] See Bava Batra 2a.

[70] See Tosafot Bava Batra 2a, Rashba Bava Batra 2a.

[71] Responsa Rashba, 2:268:

ומ”מ אם נהגו שלא להקפיד כלל על היז’ ראיה שעל הבתים וחצרות מנהג בטעות הוא ואינו מנהג. שאין מחול’ ההקפדה אלא בממונות שאדם רשאי ליתן את שלו או ליזוק בנכסיו. אבל אינו רשאי לפרוק גדרן של ישראל ושלא לנהוג בצניעות ובגורם להסתלק שכינה מלישראל הוא.

[72] See, e.g., Or Zarua’ Bava Batra no. 2:

ולא ידענא איזה מנהג שאין סומכין עליו… דהולכין בממון אחר המנהג.

[73] See Rabbenu Yonah Bava Batra 2a:

במקום שנהגו כולם שלא לבנות, שאין מקפידין על הזק ראיה, אין מחייבין אותו לבנות.

[74] Or Zarua’ Bava Metzia 280:

איתבריר לן דהולכין אחר המנהג לענין דיני ממונות…מיהו נראה בעיני וכגון שהוא מנהג קבוע על פי חכמי המקום… וזהו שאמרו מנהג מבטל הלכה מנהג וותיקין. אבל מנהג שאין לו ראיה מן התור’ אינו אלא כטועה בשיקול הדעת. הא למדת שאין מנהג חשוב אלא א”כ הנהיגוהו וותיקים וחכמי הדור.

[75] It is also not clear whether this approval needs to come from rabbinic scholars or whether it is sufficient to secure the approval of legal and political experts (e.g., lawyers, judges, politicians, economists). If the purpose of securing such approval is to ensure that a practice is fair and to the benefit of society, it may be sufficient to have the approval of legal and political experts. See, for example, the requirement of securing the approval of an adam chashuv for communal ordinances enacted by the townspeople (Bava Batra 9a). Ritva there (s.v. hanhu) explains that the adam chashuv is required to ensure that the enactment is “appropriate” and “not to the detriment of the town”. This explanation is consistent with Ritva’s characterization of the adam chashuv as someone who is both wise and holds public office:

איכא אדם חשוב בעיר אין להם רשות לעשות שום תנאי זולתו …כדי שיראה שיעשו כראוי ושאין בו הפסד לבני העיר… וכתב הר”ם הלוי ז”ל דאדם חשוב בזה הוא דאית ביה תרתי תלמיד חכם שהוא ממונה פרנס על הצבור.

[76] R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeret Moshe Choshen MIshpat I:72) appears to explicitly reject it:

א”צ שיעשה המנהג ע”פ חכמי תורה וגם אף לא ע”פ יהודים דוקא דאף שהנהיגו זה הנכרים כגון שהם רוב תושבי העיר נמי הוא מדין התורה בסתמא כפי המנהג.

[77] For the principle of kol tenai shel mammon kayam, see Bava Metzia 94a, Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 296 and Even Ha-Ezer 38:5.

For an explicit statement of the idea that minhag ha-sochrim is grounded in tenai shel mammon, see Responsa Maharashdam Choshen Mishpat 380:

כל דבר שבממון יש לו שני פנים במה שיתקיים או באחד מהדרכים הברורים כדין תורתנו הקדושה… או בכל תנאי שיתנה האדם עם חברו ומטע’ זה יועילו דרכי ההקנאות שנוהגים הסוחרים אעפ”י שאינם כתובים בתורה ואינם מן הדין אלא שכיון שנהגו כך ה”ל שכל אחד מתנה עם חברו שכשיהיה כך יתקיים הדבר ואדעתא דהכי תינח וסלקי ומטעם זה אמרינן בגמ’ פרק איזהו נשך אמר רב פפא משמיה דרבא האי סיטומתא קניא… שמעינן מהכא שהמנהג מבטל את ההלכה…

בדבר שבממון יכול לשעבד עצמו וליתן משלו שלא מן הדין כמו שאמרו מתנה ש”ח להיות כשואל כענין ערב דמשתעבד אף ע”ג דהוי אסמכתא הרי א”כ ברור שחייב האדם לקיים כל מה שנשתעבד בו אע”פי שמסתמא הוא הפך הדין אלא שהתנה כך וא”כ בעיר הנז’ כל התגרים כשעושים משאם ומתנם מתחייבים למה שהוא מנהג העיר וסוחריה ואף על פי שלא התנה ה”ל כאלו התנה.

And Responsa Chatam Sofer 2:314:

רבא הודיענו בב”מ ע”ד ע”א שהדין כן מה”ת כל שהנהיגו הסוחרים הו”ל כאלו התנו וכל תנאי שבממון קיים מה”ת… מה שהנהיגו מרצונם הטוב כל תנאי שבממון קיים מה”ת בלי ספק.

See also the formulation of Responsa Rashba 6:254. For an overview of this approach, see Ron Kleinman, Methods of Acquisition and Commercial Customs in Jewish Law (Ramat Gan, 2013) pp. 118-124. See also the analysis of R. Yona Reiss, Kanfei Yonah, pp. 37-42, which suggests that minhag ha-sochrim is grounded in the principle of kol tenai shel mammon.

[78] See Bava Metzia 94a and Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 296. For the example of a stipulation to restructure a husband’s financial obligations to his wife, see Ketubot 56a and Even Ha-Ezer 38:5.

[79] See the formulation in Responsa Rashba 6:254:

תשובה כל דבר שבממון תנאו קיים…ומוסיף אני על זה שבכ”מ שנהגו להתנות ולעשות כזה תנאי אפי’ הנושאים שם סתם גובין מהם אם מתה בלא בנים שכל הנושא סתם ע”ד הנוהג שם בישראל נושא.

See also Iggerot Moshe Choshen Mishpat I:72:

דאדעתא דמנהג העיר נחשב כהתנו בסתמא… במקום שיש מנהג הולכין אחר המנהג והטעם שבסתמא הוא כהתנו שהוא כהמנהג.

[80] See the discussions in Sections II and III above.

[81] See, e.g., Ramban Kiddushin 25b:

אפי’ פירש לו ואמר קנה במסירה דבר הנקנה במשיכה או בסימטא שאין מסירה קונה בה, אינה קונה, שלא מסרו חכמים דיני ההקנאות למוכרים.

[82] Another reason to disentangle minhag ha-sochrim from tenai shel mammon is that the latter principle is introduced in the Mishnah as a dispute between the Tana’im. See Ketubot 56a and Bava Metzia 94a. Yet there is no indication that anyone disputes the normative force of minhag ha-sochrim. This suggests that two concepts may be distinct from each other.

[83] Bava Batra 8b:

רשאין בני העיר להתנות על המדות ועל השערים, ועל שכר פועלים.

[84] Tosefta Bava Metzia 11:24:

ורשאין הצמרין והצבעין לומר כל מקח שיבוא לעיר נהא כולנו שותפין בו.

[85] Tosefta Bava Metzia 11:25-26:

רשאין החמרין לומר כל מי שתמות חמורו נעמיד לו חמור אחר…רשאין הספנין לומר כל מי שתאבד ספינתו נעמיד לו ספינה אחרת.

[86] Tosefta Bava Metzia 11:23:

רשאין בני העיר לומר… כל מי שתרצה או מי שתרעה פרתו בין הכרמים יהא נותן כך וכך וכל מי שתראה בהמת פלנית יהא נותן כך וכך.

[87] Tosefta Bava Metzia 11:25:

רשאין נחתומין לעשות רגיעה ביניהן.

And see Ramban Bava Batra 9a:

ופי’ רגיעה חלוקת הרגעים, לא תמכור ברגעי ולא אמכור ברגעך.

[88] See the next note. Ritva (Bava Batra 8a) explicitly connects the power of the townspeople to enact such legislation with the power of a beit din to reassign and redefine property rights:

ולהסיע על קיצותם וכו’. פירוש לתת קנס על מי שיעבור דבריהם כדאמרינן לקמן בעובדא דטבחי, כלומר שיסיעוהו מדין תורה, או מממונו, או מן העיר, ומשום דהפקר ב”ד הפקר כדכתיב וכל אשר לא יבוא לשלשת ימים.

[89] See Responsa Rashba 1:729

מה שתקנו הקהל הרשות בידם. דכל דבר שבממון יכולין הקהל להקל על עצמם ולהחמיר…. וכ”ש קהל שקבלו ועשו תקנה במה שיראה בעיניהם שהוא מקובל להם. וכל ציבור וציבור במקומן כגאונים וכל ישראל שתקנו כמה תקנות לכל וקיימות לכל ישראל.

Responsa Rashba 5:126:

שורת הדין בהסכמת בני המדינה כל שהרוב מסכימין ומתקנין ומקבלין עליהם אין משגיחין לדברי היחיד שרוב כל העיר ועיר אצל יחידיהם הם כב”ד הגדול אצל כל ישראל. ואם גזרו הם גזירתם קיימת. והעובר ענוש יענש.

Responsa Rashba 4:11:

וכן מה שיגזרו או יסכימו רובו של קהל בצרכי קהלה כיון שעשו כן הרוב אפי’ בעל כרחם של יחידים מה שעשו עשוי. ודוקא שעשו הרוב ובדבר שרוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בו כדאיתא בפרק אין מעמידין. לפי שכל צבור וצבור היחידי’ כנתונין תחת יד הרבים על פיהם הם צריכין להתנהג בכל עניניהם והם לאנשי עירם ככל ישראל לב”ד הגדול או למלך ובין שיהיו במעמדם ובין שלא יהיו.

Responsa Rivash 399:

יכולין בני העיר לעשו’ ביניהם תקנות וגדרי’ והסכמות ולקנוס העובר עליהם מדין תורה. דגרסי’ בב”ב (ח’:) ורשאין בני העיר להתנות על המדות ועל השערים ועל שכר פועלי’ ולהסיע על קיצותם… ולא זו בלבד אמרו אלא אף בכל ענין שיראה בעיניהם לתקן ולקנוס העובר, הרשות בידם. אלא דלרבותא נקט הני ואף על גב דאינן דברים כוללין לכל בני המדינה אבל הם כנגד מוכרי פירות לבד, או כנגד הפועלים לבד ואית להו פסידא בהכי, אעפ”כ הרשות בידם…

ולפי זה עלה בידינו שהקהל יכולים לקנוס בתקנותיהם כפי אשר יראה בעיניהן ואפי’ בחוצה לארץ… שהדבר שהסכימו עליו בני העיר הרי הוא כאלו קבלוהו כל א’ על עצמו ונתחייבו בו. ועוד כיון שעשו כן מפני שראו שיש גדר ותקנה בדבר, הוה ליה כהודאות והלואות ושליחותייהו קא עבדי. וגובין הקנסות ששמו בתקנתן. … מה שעושין בני העיר בעירם לענין תקנותיהם הרי הם כבי דינא דרב אמי ורב אסי, ועדיפי מינייהו.

Note that Rivash explicitly sources the sovereign legislative authority of the townspeople and their status as a beit din over the community’s monetary affairs in the the talmudic passage in Bava Batra 8b.

For other examples, see Responsa Maharashdam Choshen Mishpat 447:

דבר פשוט הוא כי מה שעושים הקהל או ראשי הקהל הוא מאושר ומקויים עליהם כדבר הנגזר מפי ב”ד הגדול

Responsa Rashbash 566:

ודין הצבור על קהלם כדין ב”ד לכל העולם …ואלים כחא דצבורא ככח ב”ד.

Responsa Yachin u-Bo’az 2:20:

כמו שיש רשות ביד ב”ד להפקיר ולעשות תקנות ולהקנות במה שאין הדין נותן כך הם הצבור יש להם כח ורשות להפקיר מדאמרינן בפ”ק דבתרא (דף ח’ ע”ב) תניא רשאין בני העיר להתנות על השערים ועל המדות ועל שכירות פועלים ולהסיע על קיצותן … נמצינו למדין מזה שהצבור רשאין הם להעניש ולהפקיר כמו שיכולין ב”ד להעניש ולהפקיר… נמצא עכשו שהצבור דינם כדין ב”ד ויש רשות בידם גם הם להעניש ולהפקיר ממון האדם…

ודין ב”ד וצבור ששוה בזה שכח הצבור על היחידים ככח הנשיא על כל ישראל.

Note that, like Rivash, the Yachin u-Bo’az sources the townspeople’s power to legislate and their status as a beit din in Bava Batra 8b.

See also Chazon Ish Bava Batra 5:4 s.v. Tosafot:

הא דהולכים אחר המנהג… מפני שהסכמת הציבור הוי ככח בית דין.

[90] It’s an interesting question whether participation in general elections (not exclusive to the Jewish community) to appoint representatives, who then enact legislation, would count as a type of communal self-legislation under the halakhic principle of rasha’in benei ha-’ir le-ha-si’a al kitzatan (Bava Batra 8b). If yes, it might be argued that as long as sufficient members of the Jewish community participate in elections, then ordinary legislation (e.g., Congress, state legislatures, city councils) may carry with it the halakhic force of Bava Batra 8b.

[91] Bava Metzia 104a:

רבי מאיר היה דורש לשון הדיוט; דתניא, רבי מאיר אומר: אם אוביר ולא אעביד אשלם במיטבא.

[92] See Tosafot Bava Metzia 104a:

היה דורש לשון הדיוט לשונות שלא תיקנו חכמים לכתוב אלא הדיוטות הורגלו לכותבן היה דורש ואפילו לא כתב כאילו נכתב.

[93] Bava Metzia 104a:

הלל הזקן היה דורש לשון הדיוט; דתניא: אנשי אלכסנדריא היו מקדשין את נשותיהם, ובשעת כניסתן לחופה באין אחרים וחוטפים אותם מהן, ובקשו חכמים לעשות בניהם ממזרים. אמר להן הלל הזקן: הביאו לי כתובת אמכם. הביאו לו כתובת אמן, ומצא שכתוב בהן לכשתכנסי לחופה הוי לי לאינתו, ולא עשו בניהם ממזרים.

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