Rabbenu Tam’s Harchakos: Social Pressure and the Limits of Coercion

Rabbi Michoel Zylberman
March 11, 2026

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Rabbi Michoel Zylberman

Rabbenu Tam’s Harchakos: Social Pressure and the Limits of Coercion[1]

Introduction

As a matter of Biblical law, a husband must give his wife a get of his own free will, and a get given under illicit duress is invalid.[2] Physical or financial[3] coercion[4] meant to encourage the issuance of a get could invalidate the divorce. While there are circumstances under which a beis din may sanction forms of coercion, those circumstances are in practice very limited.[5] This article explores the circumstances under which communal and social pressure against an individual who refuses to comply with a beis din directive to give or receive a get[6] would be permissible–indeed appropriate–and not constitute illicit coercion.

The package of communal sanctions that a beis din may impose on a party who is noncompliant with a directive to issue a get is referred to as harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam, literally the distancing methods of Rabbenu Tam. Rabbenu Tam, in his work Sefer Hayashar (24), writes[7] that when the rabbis believe that it is appropriate for a husband to give his wife a get and he fails to comply with their recommendation, members of his community may be proscribed from speaking with him, doing business with him, hosting him, providing him with food and drink, escorting him, and visiting him when he is sick, and the rabbinic establishment may impose other similar sanctions as it sees fit. Rema (154:21) codifies this directive and adds to this list not performing bris milah for his sons and not burying them.[8]

Are Harchakos Coercive?

In analyzing why Rabbenu Tam’s sanctions do not constitute illicit coercion, Maharik (135, cited in Biur HaGra 154:67) makes two points. First, denial of privileges to a recalcitrant husband does not constitute coercion since the husband could move to a different community where people do not know him and would not be constrained from doing business with him or interacting with him (“שאם ירצה ימצא לו מקום”).[9] Beyond the first line of reasoning, Maharik adds that harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam are not directed against a person physically (“והוא לא ילקה בגופו”). Rather, members of a community are empowered to make a collective decision not to engage with the recalcitrant individual. As Levush writes (134:10), כי אין החרם חל עליו אלא עלינו אם לא נתפרד מעליו – there is no excommunication imposed on the husband himself: It is the community that is enjoined from having anything to do with the husband. In the slightly different formulation of Responsa Binyamin Zev (88, cited in Darchei Moshe Ha’aruch 154:21), such social pressures are permissible because they fall short of physical or financial coercion; these methods serve to withhold benefits that the husband is not objectively entitled to rather than remove something that he already has (either money or physical health). In the language of Sefer Hayashar itself, such measures do not rise to the level of coercion because שאם ירצה מקיים – a person can bear the brunt of the sanctions and still function in society, even if people refuse to honor him or do business with him.[10] According to this reason, even if a husband had nowhere to escape to, since the types of sanctions included in harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam are not considered crippling, a get given under harchakos would be valid.[11]

Chazon Ish (Even Haezer 108:12) quotes an opinion[12] that we should not impose harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam nowadays since these measures are the effective equivalent of putting a person in nidduy (excommunication), a drastic category of social ostracism more likely to be viewed as coercive in this context (see Rama, Even Haezer 154:21). While Chazon Ish expresses skepticism of this argument since it did not deter Rabbenu Tam himself,[13] in practice he recommends not invoking harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam absent a beis din ruling allowing for actual coercive measures.

Despite Chazon Ish’s misgivings, many authorities of the previous generation encouraged the implementation of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer 7 Even Haezer 23 and 8 Even Haezer 25) writes that even though Mahari ibn Leib (cited in footnote 12) wrote that he has not seen harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam invoked in practice, that fact by itself does not imply harchakos are illegitimate (לא ראינו אינו ראיה). On the contrary, he cites many examples of decisors throughout the centuries, both in Sefardic and Ashkenazic lands, who implemented harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. The two aforementioned teshuvos of Rav Ovadia Yosef contain rulings of the Beit Din Hagadol (the Supreme Rabbinic Court of Appeals), signed by Rav Ovadia Yosef, the Tzitz Eliezer (Rav Eliezer Waldenberg – see Tzitz Eliezer 17:51), and Rav Yitzchak Kolitz (Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem), which promulgated harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam against recalcitrant husbands. This is the general approach of most contemporary batei din, both in Israel and abroad.

Content of the Harchokos

As far as the substance of Rabbenu Tam’s harchakos, Rav Ovadia writes (ibid. 8:25) that no one should speak to the recalcitrant husband, do business with him, host him, provide food or drink to him, visit him if sick, allow him into shul, allow him to lead the service, receive an aliyah or recite kaddish, or inquire about his welfare until he complies with the beis din’s directive.[14]

The Beth Din of America typically uses the following language when issuing harchakos d’Rabbeinu Tam against a recalcitrant husband:

• Members of the Jewish community should not speak to him other than when absolutely necessary.

• Members of the Jewish community should decline to host him in their homes, or to provide him with food or drink, or invite him to their parties or otherwise socialize with him.

• Jewish communal institutions, including synagogues, should adopt the following sanctions against him: (i) that he not be permitted to occupy any elective or appointive position, nor to serve as an employee, within the institution or within any of its affiliates, (ii) that he be excluded from membership in the institution or in any of its affiliates, (iii) that he not be given any honor or recognition, nor be granted any right or privilege of participation within liturgical services on any occasion whatsoever and (iv) that his name be announced on a regular monthly basis at the conclusion of Shabbat services, and be published in the bulletin of the institution, with respect to his refusal to deliver a Get to his wife, with a call to the membership to limit their social and economic relations with him, until such time as he participates in the Get process.

Who Issues Harchakos?

R. Avraham Hurwitz (Kuntris Habirurim p. 35) writes that it is not necessary to have a beis din invoke harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam; the rabbi of a city or a prominent rabbi may do so unilaterally in cases of ma’is alay (see footnote 7 above), especially in a situation of protracted recalcitrance. He cites Maharik (133 and 166) who writes that if a recalcitrant husband is jailed for tax evasion or some other unrelated infraction, community members need not exert any effort to have him freed so long as he is not prepared to give his wife a get.[15] Maharik does not require a ruling from a beis din.[16] However, even if this may be correct as a technical matter, it may be unwise from a public policy perspective to countenance the promulgation of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam without a beis din ruling and supervision.[17]

In the spirit of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam, the State of Israel, in a law amended in 1995,[18] provides for removing certain privileges from a recalcitrant party when instructed to do so by a beis din. This law allows for preventing the noncompliant spouse from leaving the country, receiving an Israeli passport, receiving or renewing a driver’s license,[19] and opening or withdrawing funds from a bank account.[20] In 2018 the Knesset passed legislation that granted the batei din in Israel jurisdiction over foreigners who are not Israeli citizens but are visiting Israel when there was a beis din ruling regarding a get in the parties’ country of origin.[21] The batei din could then legally prevent a party from leaving the country in such a situation. However, the Israeli Supreme Court recently restricted the batei din’s ability to impose such sanctions on non-residents.

Demonstrations and Social Media

To what extent does the framework of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam allow for other forms of social pressure? Would demonstrating outside the home or business of a recalcitrant party or publicising his recalcitrance on social media be legitimate as part of harchakos or constitute illicit coercion?

On the one hand, the classic manifestations of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam involve refraining from according honor or providing services, in contrast to protesting, which is proactive. Nevertheless, demonstrating against an individual who has been subjected to harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam may be a form of publicizing the beis din ruling. As Rav Ovadia Yosef writes (Yabia Omer Vol. 8 Even Haezer end of Siman 25), it is acceptable to publicize such a beis din ruling in newspapers and shuls to make the public aware that an individual is subject to harchakos. Rav Hershel Schachter suggests that public protests against an individual who has not complied with a beis din directive may constitute a fulfillment of the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling (154:21) that it is permissible to call a husband who refuses the rabbis’ order to give his wife a get an avaryan (a sinner).[22]

Some have claimed that protesting or even imposing classic harchakos constitute a form of bizayon (embarrassment), which could rise to the level of improper coercion. They cite a responsum of Rashba (Shu”t Meyuchasos 414) that a beis din may threaten a noncompliant husband “ובלבד שלא ינדוהו ולא יבזוהו ולא יצערו אותו בגופו” – “So long as they do not excommunicate him or embarrass him or cause him physician pain”.[23] However, many have noted[24] that Rivash (127) presents Rashba’s position without the phrase ולא יבזוהו. Kuntres Habirurm further observes that Beis Yosef cites the Rashba and does not present him as disagreeing with harchakos D’Rabbenu Tam. This indicates that Beis Yosef did not believe that embarrassing a husband would constitute illicit coercion.[25] [26]

Coercion in Another Context: Commercial Dinei Torah

When it comes to commercial dinei Torah, the halachic concerns surrounding coercion are less acute, since there is no risk that pressure exerted on a litigant will invalidate a get. If a party ignores the hazmanos (summonses) sent by the beis din and refuses to appear for a din Torah, Rema rules (Choshen Mishpat 11:1 based on Bava Kamma 112b) that the beis din may place the recalcitrant party in nidduy (excommunication)[27] and grant the plaintiff permission to pursue his claims in secular court (26:2). The ramifications of being excommunicated include not sitting within four amos of the menudeh, not eating with him, not counting him for a minyan, and avoiding non-essential conversation with him (Yoreh Deah 334:2).[28]

Nevertheless, authorities have historically been cautious about invoking the most severe forms of communal pressure even in this context. Taz (Yoreh Deah 334:23) notes that already in his day there was a reluctance to invoke formal nidduy even against individuals who committed grave aveiros. Similarly, Maharam Alshich (125) writes that in his generation (a century before the Taz) nidduy was not invoked against someone who refused to appear in beis din.[29] In place of a formal nidduy, a beis din will typically issue a seruv, a letter of contempt, against a party that fails to respond to a hazmanah, coupled with a heter arkaos permitting the plaintiff to pursue his claims in secular court.[30]

R. Avraham Dambarmadiker (Seder HaDin Chapter 1 footnote 54) notes that many batei din include in their seruv language a reference to Yoreh Deah 334, the section of Shulchan Arukh that codifies the laws of nidduy, implying that one who has a seruv against him should be treated as a menudeh (excommunicated). However, he suggests that the intent of the citation may simply be to indicate that the nonresponsive party deserves to be placed in nidduy, even if in practice we refrain from doing so. R. Uriel Lavie (Ateres Devorah Vol. 2 Choshen Mishpat 4) notes part of the reluctance to place such a person in nidduy is that people will inevitably not fully understand the parameters of a nidduy and not comply with its enforcement, which could further erode the beis din’s authority.[31] Ultimately, even if a nidduy is not invoked, the party seeking relief in beis din is not left without recourse, as he may pursue his claims in secular court.

The common practice of batei din is to issue a seruv without explicit directives as to how to enforce the seruv. R. Lavie writes that it is left to the discretion of the local rabbi to determine how to enforce a seruv in a way that may be effective in convincing the recalcitrant party to submit to beis din. Sometimes this might involve combining social pressure with convincing argumentation.[32] This reflects the practice of the Beth Din of America and its general orientation towards seruvin. In principle, the types of social pressure covered by harchakos D’Rabbenu Tam could be invoked against an individual for whom a seruv has been issued.

NOTES

  1. An earlier version of this article appeared in Hebrew in Shaarei Zedek Vol. 19, pp. 131-136. ↑
  2. See Mishnah Yevamos 112b, Gittin 88b, Shulchan Aruch Even Haezer 134:5,7. All references to Shulchan Aruch and its commentaries in this article are to Even Haezer unless otherwise noted. ↑
  3. See Pischei Teshuvah 134:11. ↑
  4. See Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 205:7, and sources cited in R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, Chapter 10 regarding perceived coercion. ↑
  5. Shulchan Aruch 134 and 154 outlines circumstances of sanctioned coercion. For a brief but comprehensive summary of the parameters of sanctioned coercion see R. Gedalia Dov Schwartz, Comments on the New York State “Get Law“. Also see R. Yosef Goldberg, Eilu Shekofin L’hotzi and R. Zvi Gertner, Kefiah B’get. ↑
  6. As a matter of Biblical law, a husband may divorce his wife against her will (Mishnah Yevamos 112b, Rambam Geirushin 1:2, Shulchan Aruch 119:6). However, Rabbenu Gershom promulgated a cherem against any man who divorces his wife against her will (Rema 119:6). [The commentaries on Shulchan Aruch dispute whether a get given to a woman against her will may be valid post facto – see Beis Shmuel 119:12 and Pischei Teshuvah 119:7.] As such, in practice a get requires the willing participation of both husband and wife. If a wife refuses to comply with a beis din directive to receive a get, there would presumably be grounds to invoke harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam against her (See R. Yosef Goldberg, Eilu Shekofin L’hotzi 17:8 and footnote 14). However, the potential concern about a get accepted by the wife under duress is less severe, since such a get remains Biblically valid. ↑
  7. The context of Rabbenu Tam’s presentation in Sefer Hayashar is the sugya of ma’is alay. The gemara in Kesubos 63b says that if a woman claims that her husband is repulsive to her (ma’is alay) we do not force her to remain married to him. The rishonim debate whether under such circumstances we may compel the husband to give his wife a get. According to Rambam (Ishus 14:8) and one opinion in Tosafos (s.v. aval amrah) and Rosh (5:34), we may compel the husband to give his wife a get. However, many rishonim, including Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, and Rosh – codified by Rema (77:3) – hold that the husband cannot be compelled to give his wife a get in the case of ma’is alay. Among those that do not allow for coercion in this case, there is a further dispute as to whether the husband is nevertheless obligated to give his wife a get. According to Rabbenu Yona (Shitah Mekubetzes 64a) there is a mitzvah for the husband to give his wife a get, whereas according to Rabbenu Tam we would merely advise the husband to give a get. [For further analysis of these positions see R. Yosef Goldberg, Eilu Shekofin L’hotzi Chapter 12 footnote 10, and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv in Piskei Din Rabaniim (henceforth PDR) Vol. 7 pp. 204-205. See also R. Gedalia Felder, Nachalas Tzvi Vol. 2 p. 83, R. Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer 3 Even Haezer 18:13, and R. Chagai Izrir in Shuras HaDin Vol. 2 p. 64.] In this context Rabbenu Tam writes that even though we may not coerce the husband to give his wife a get or excommunicate him, we may nevertheless impose harchakos. ↑
  8. The Rema’s source is Teshuvas Binyamin Zev 88, who includes in harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam שלא ימולו בנו ולא ילמדו לו ספר ולא יקברוהו – not to circumcise his son, not to teach him, and not to bury him. Presumably the antecedent of ‘not to bury him’ is ‘his son’. The language of Rema in our edition of Shulchan Aruch is או למול את בניו או לקברם – to circumcise his sons or to bury them. [Even if the text were to read לקברו – to bury him – as per the Rema’s citation of Binyamin Zev in Darchei Moshe 154:18, the antecedent would still be ‘his son’.] As precedent for withholding such privileges from the relative of a noncompliant party, Nimukei Yosef (Bava Kamma 39b in Dapei Harif s.v. kasav haRif) cites Rav Paltoi Gaon as holding that if an individual fails to pay out a sum ordered by beis din, the beis din may issue a directive to all communities to bar him from participating in a minyan or zimun, to not allow a bris milah for his son, to not bury his relatives, and to expel his children from school. [See Maharshal, Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kamma 10:13, who accepts the restriction on milah and burial but emphatically denies that children could ever be expelled from school because of a parent’s infraction.] See Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 334:10 and Rema 334:6 who rule that a beis din has the discretion to decree that the community may not perform milah or bury the relatives of an individual who is in nidduy (excommunication). See reference to such a practice in Shu”t Rashba Hameyuchasos 244. See R. Refoel Kroizer, Hageirushin B’halacha p. 172, who suggests without evidence that the rishonim who refer to denying burial to the relative of a person subject to nidduy or harchakos only meant to include the children of the noncompliant party and not their parents or other relatives.In 2019, in response to a request from an American beis din, then Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Dovid Lau, instructed that the recently deceased mother of a man who had been refusing to grant his wife a get for many years and had since remarried on the basis of a fraudulent heter meah rabbonim should be denied burial until the son would give his wife a get. This ruling reflected an acceptance of the view that withholding burial is a legitimate sanction under harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. See R. Lau’s justification for his decision in Techumin Vol. 40 pp. 19-33. A September 2019 letter from the beis din of R. Yitzchok Zilberstein to the same American beis din supported this ruling. In explaining the justification for ostensibly punishing parents for the sins of children, the letter cites a Toras Kohanim (Vakira 20:5) (see also Shavuos 39a) that says that every member of a family of robbers is a robber because all family members cover for the guilty party. R. Lau notes representations that the deceased mother in his case aided and abetted her recalcitrant son. He cites Ritva (Moed Katan s.v. mina lan) who writes that beis din has the right to penalize those who assist an individual who refuses to submit to beis din. See, however, R. Shlomo Dichovsky in Hamayan Vol. 247 Tishrei 5784 p. 280 and Techumin Vol. 40 pp. 34-42 who opposes denial of burial of a relative as an application of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam in practice even if it may be justifiable in principle. ↑
  9. R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, Appendix 6, quotes many authorities who accept this as the primary justification for harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. Arguably, this reason alone may be less compelling in contemporary times. In our global society in which it is easy to widely disseminate information, it may be much more difficult for someone to move to another community, or even another country, and not still be subject to the effect of harchakos. On the other hand, Rabbi Zvi Gertner, Kefiah B’get, p. 483, posits that nowadays, as rabbinic authority has been significantly eroded, a rabbinic proclamation not to accord honor to or do business with a recalcitrant husband may not be fully respected even in the husband’s original community. See also R. Dovid Lau in Techumin Vol. 40 p. 20 footnote 2.Furthermore, if the rationale for harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam is that a person could move elsewhere to avoid its consequences, that could raise serious concerns with one of the tools used by the Israeli Rabbinical Courts to enforce compliance with get-related directives, namely their ability to issue a tzav ikuv, a travel ban that forbids someone for leaving the country before complying with the beis din’s ruling. See, for example, PDR Vol 16 p. 263. See R. Chaim Zimbalist, Shuras Hadin Vol. 5 p. 236, who argues that if a beis din issues harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam they may not issue a tzav ikuv, as doing so could render a get given as a result of those harchakos invalid. See also R. Zvi Gertner ibid. R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, Chapter 6 footnote 7 is troubled by a ruling of Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer Even Haezer 8:25) who, as part of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam, allowed for confiscating a husband’s passport and publicizing the harchakos in newspapers. If the husband is prevented from leaving the country and the national newspapers publicize the harchakos, there would be no place that the husband could travel to where people would not ostracize him and Maharik’s justification would not apply. R. Goldberg therefore assumes that Rav Ovadia only meant to allow for the publication of harchakos in local newspapers but not national newspapers. R. Goldberg further argues (Chapter 6 footnotes 7-8) that if a person has a compelling reason to leave the country and is prevented from doing so by a beis din order and then gives a get on that basis, the get may be considered issued under duress. He quotes an unpublished responsum from his father-in-law, R. Shmuel Kahana-Shapiro, an av beis din in Yerushlayim (and brother of the former Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Avrohom Shapiro), who ruled that a get given by a Breslevor Chossid who had a tzav ikuv against him that prevented him from traveling to Uman for Rosh Hashana was invalid. However, as widely reported in the media, in October 2024 a beis din in Israel arranged a get under precisely these circumstances for a husband who had been refusing to give his a wife a get for two years and was prevented from traveling to Uman for Rosh Hashanah. ↑
  10. See, however, the aforementioned PDR, that quotes Chasam Sofer as noting the preponderance of errors in the printed text of Sefer Hayashar. ↑
  11. Gra (154:67) quotes both reasons of Maharik, presumably indicating that both need to be in place to justify harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. ↑
  12. Pischei Teshuva (154:30) citing Shach in Gevuros Anashim based on Mahari ibn Leib (2:18). ↑
  13. It is clear in the rishonim’s formulation of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam that the harchakos fall short of constituting a nidduy or shamta (forms of excommunication). R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, Appendix 6 notes that Chazon Ish did not have access to the original Sefer Hayashar in which this point is explicit. ↑
  14. R. Moshe Shturnbuch (Teshuvos V’Hanhagos 5:344) writes that when notifying a community to shun a husband who is not following a beis din directive regarding a get, its members should not say that the reason they are sanctioning him is to convince him to give a get. Maharshdam (Even Haezer 71) makes the same point regarding harchakos against a yabam refusing to grant chalitzah to his sister-in-law. R. J. David Bleich, “The Sanctions of R. Tam and Their Modern Day Counterparts Part 1,” Tradition, Spring 2025, pp. 143-145, observes that Maharshdam views harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam as intended to enforce compliance with a beis din’s directive as opposed to the giving of a get, and as such there should be no explicit linkage between harchakos and the get. Only when there is no such linkage do harchakos not constitute coercion. R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh 6:4, and footnote 8 therein, argues that even in a situation where the husband cannot move to a different location, if people do not state that they are implementing harchakos to coerce the get, a get given under those circumstances would be valid. However, R. Avraham Hurwitz (author of Dvar Halacha on Hilchos Yichud and Orchos Rabbenu), in his Kuntris Habirurim (1975), pp. 32-34, demonstrates that the rishonim that quote Rabbenu Tam sound like the reason for implementation of harchakos (i.e., to encourage the giving of a get) may and should be stated. See, for example, Maharik (cited earlier), Rivash (127), and Rema (154:21). He suggests that had Maharshdam seen the actual text of Maharik’s ruling he would not have imposed such a restriction. R. Hurwitz limits Maharshdam’s application. ↑
  15. See also Mordechai (Gittin 469) in the name of Rabbenu Tam who writes that informing a husband that the community will not assist in getting him released from jail for an unrelated charge until he gives his wife a get does not constitute coercion, as they are not taking any action against him. They are merely refraining from offering assistance. See R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, Chapter 6 ft. 25-27, who demonstrates that many rishonim accept this position. ↑
  16. He also cites Rivash (232) who writes that if one violates the takanas hakahal (community enactment) to only effect kiddushin in the presence of a minyan and then refuses to give his wife a get, the community need not exert any effort to have him released from jail until he agrees to give his wife a get. ↑
  17. May a beis din issue harchakos against an individual who ignores hazmanos to submit to beis din to address a claim for a get? Typically, where one party wishes to arrange a get, the beis din will send out a hazmanah summoning a party to address the request for a get. If the party in receipt of the hazmanah is not prepared to give or receive a get at that time, the Beth Din of America will offer that he or she may agree to submit to a hearing at the beis din to determine when and whether a get should be given. If the recipient of the hazmanah fails to respond altogether, the beis din could issue a seruv sanctioning the nonresponsive party for failing to appear in front of the beis din to address the request for a get (but not for failing to give or receive a get). In this situation, the beis din has no basis to issue a ruling as to whether a get should be given, as it has not convened and not heard from both sides. As such, formal harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam may not be in order. At the same time, since the party seeking a get has no recourse in secular court, any permissible means that would be effective in getting the recalcitrant party to appear in beis din to address the claim for a get should be pursued. Arguably, publicising the seruv and the fact that the noncompliant party refuses to come to beis din should be justified by the directive to label such a person an avaryan, as we will discuss below. Forms of social sanctions approximating harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam to encourage the noncompliant party to appear in beis din to address the claim for a get – but not to give or receive a get per se – may be in order as well. See R. Chaim Vidal, Shaarei Zedek Vol. 24 pp. 72-137, for a discussion as to whether there are circumstances when a beis din could issue a ruling regarding a get without the husband participating in a hearing. See also R. Uriel Lavie in a psak from Beit Din Yerushalayim 1022249-6 (2019). According to their analysis there may be situations when a beis din could rule that a husband is obligated to give his wife a get and impose harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam even when the husband did not appear at a hearing. ↑
  18. Israel’s Rabbinical Courts (Execution of Divorce Judgments) Law, 1995, section 1(b). ↑
  19. See R. Uriel Lavie, Shuras HaDin, Vol. 5 pp. 237-272, who justifies revoking a driver’s license as falling within the parameters of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. He argues that revoking a license should not be viewed as removing something that the husband has but rather as not providing a privilege – the state has the right to decide that it is not extending the privilege of driving to a given individual. Cf. R. J. David Bleich, “The Sanctions of R. Tam and Their Modern Day Counterparts Part 2,” Tradition Summer 2025 p. 100. R. Lavie acknowledges that if the husband’s livelihood is dependent on his ability to drive and he has no ability to leave the country, there may be a concern of illicit coercion. See also R. Binyamin Beeri, Kinsei Dayanim 5778 pp. 289-290 who recommends limiting the revocation of a taxi driver’s license to a specific area to allow the possibility of making a living in a different part of the country.The law also provides for revoking a professional license. R. J. David Bleich ibid. p. 99 presents a number of reasons to argue that a professional license could be considered a property interest such that revocation of such a license may constitute a financial penalty which could not be justified as part of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. ↑
  20. This law has engendered discussion in the rabbinic literature as to whether it is more sweeping than what would be allowed as part of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam (see, for example, R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, appendix 5-6). If an Israeli beis din rules that actual coercion is appropriate, the recalcitrant party may be jailed for not complying with a beis din’s ruling. In a 2008 ruling (8455-64-1), the Beit Din Hagadol (in a panel of R. Shlomo Dichovsky, R. Avraham Sherman, and R. Tzvi Boaron), ruled that a husband incarcerated for refusing to comply with a beis din ruling to give his wife a get (in which the beis din ruled that he could be forced to do so) could be denied mehadrin food, as an application of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam.A 2000 expansion of the 1995 law allows for jailing a party who refuses to comply with a beis din directive to give or receive a get, even when the beis din has not authorized coercion. R. Shlomo Dichovsky, Techumin 25 pp. 132-148 acknowledges serious concerns about the validity of a get given under such circumstances and suggests some justifications for jailing a recalcitrant party, including that the incarceration may be a punishment for not respecting the beis din and not for not following the beis din’s ruling about a get. See R. Dovid Lau, Kinsei Dayanim 5778, pp. 300-320. See also R. Yeshoshua Ehrenberg, Dvar Yehoshua Vol. 3 Even Haezer 31:2. ↑
  21. When Rabbi Dovid Lau, then Chief Rabbi, spoke at a conference of American dayanim hosted by the Beth Din of America in 2019, he reported that in the first year since that law was implemented, the batei din in Israel handled 24 such cases. ↑
  22. See Tosafos Yevamos (64. s.v. yotzi), Rosh Yevamos (6:11), and Shitah Mekubetzes (Kesubos 64a in the name of Rabbenu Yona). See also R. Yona Reiss, Kanfei Yonah, 36. ↑
  23. See kol koreis (rabbinic proclamations) printed in an anonymous polemical work entitled Pulmos Gitei Hakezav (2018) p. 10, 40. ↑
  24. See Get Meuseh, Appendix 6, Kuntris Haberurim Chapter 3, Teshuvos V’hanhagos 5:344. ↑
  25. R. Yosef Goldberg, Get Meuseh, Chapter 1 footnote 9 reads Rashbash (339) and Shu”t Mabit (2:38) as holding that a get given in response to embarrassment of the husband does not constitute a coerced get, even if harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam had not been issued. R. J. David Bleich, Tradition Summer 2025 p. 100 ft. 59, argues that the omission of the phrase ולא יבזוהו in Rivash does not imply that Rivash permits humiliating a person who has not been subject to harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam. R. Bleich does acknowledge that such measures would be appropriate when harchakos have been issued after a beis din ordered a husband to give a get or even when a husband has not responded to hazmanos (summonses) from a beis din to address a claim for a get.See also Teshuvos V’hanhagos 1:789, where R. Moshe Shturnbuch writes that even if one were reluctant to impose harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam, deciding not to give someone an aliya or preventing him from serving as shaliach tzibur is considered ‘not honoring him’, rather than embarrassing him, and minimal embarrassment should not be considered a form of coercion on any level. ↑
  26. R. Yitzchak Meir Yaavetz (Techumin Vol. 37 pp. 307-312) addresses the propriety of “shaming” a recalcitrant party through publicizing his recalcitrance and beis din decisions against him on the internet and social media. The author assumes that such techniques would be subsumed under the limitations of harchakos d’Rabbenu Tam, and therefore if the information were to be publicized across the entire Jewish world such that there would be no place where the husband could move without his status being known, a get given as a result would be invalid. He quotes R. Shlomo Dichovsky, senior dayan emeritus of the Beit Din Hagadol, as saying that as long as the husband could move to a remote location with no Jewish population and live peacefully, we need not be concerned about the coercive effect of the publicity. R. Yaavetz argues that Maharik’s formulation suggests the husband could move to a location where he could benefit from a Jewish community. If no such option is available, a get given under such circumstances may be invalid. However, based on our earlier discussion, it is arguable that publicising a recalcitrant party’s status, even to the entire world, is an expression of מותר לקרותו עבריין – referring to the noncompliant party as a sinner – and would not in and of itself constitute coercion. Furthermore, even if we accept R. Yaavetz’s premise, it is unlikely that there is any beis din whose ruling would be accepted and enforced by every Jewish community across the globe. As such, even if the rabbanut were to publicize the identity of a recalcitrant party through every available medium, such a party could surely find a shul somewhere in the world where the rabbanut’s rulings hold little sway. See PDR Online Repository No. 57 (available on Bar Ilan Shu”t Project). ↑
  27. See Shu”t Maharam Mintz 83 who views this tool, coupled with the ability to obligate the noncompliant party to pay court fees incurred by the Plaintiff, as necessary to preserve law and order in society. See Darchei Moshe Choshen Mishpat 19:2 who quotes the Rav Paltoy Gaon cited in footnote 8 above. See also Rema Choshen Mishpat 15:5.↑
  28. See Shach, Yoreh Deah 134:8, who notes that although Shulchan Aruch rules that one who is in nidduy may not be counted for a minyan or a mezuman, that is only true for an individual placed in nidduy for violating aveiros, but not for someone placed in nidduy for failing to respond to a beis din summons over a monetary claim. See also Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 55:12 and Biur Halacha. ↑
  29. R. Uriel Lavie (Ateres Devorah Vol. 2 Choshen Mishpat 4) cites Tzror HaKesef (Derech 1 Shaar 1 Os 1 s.v. v’eik kovin) who quotes his rebbe the Rashba as holding that beis din has the discretion to decline to put a party in nidduy for failing to respond to a beis din’s hazmana. ↑
  30. See Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 26:2. For explanations of the rationale for providing permission to pursue claims in secular court, see R. Yaakov Feit, The Prohibition Against Going to Secular Courts, in Journal of the Beth Din of America, Vol. 1, p. 31, footnote 6. ↑
  31. See also R. Yoezer Ariel, Dinei Borrerut, pp. 175-6. ↑
  32. R. Lavie notes that ultimately the matter of a seruv should be between beis din and the recalcitrant party. If the respondent refuses to submit to beis din, the plaintiff has recourse to be made whole through the secular court system (even though arguably litigating in beis din, aside from being halachically preferable, will often be cheaper and faster). The seruv still serves the important aim of protecting the honor of beis din and its responsibility to enforce compliance with the halachic mandate that Jewish parties adjudicate their claims against each other before a beis din and not in secular court. ↑

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